RELIGION, POLITICS, AND MOBILISATION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
WITH A SPECIAL NOTE ON “THE INDIAN KHILAFAT MOVEMENT”

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Religion, Ideology, and Symbolism: Preliminary Notes

There are ‘problems of defining religion’. However, since religion possesses great functional value and, as a dimension of human life, is believed to have been present since time immemorial, one must at least be able to bring out its distinctive traits. The following characteristics, accordingly, are identified by various students of religion, “in no particular order of priority” (Alatas 1977: 215-16):

“(a) belief in a supernatural being (or beings) together with a corresponding invisible order opposed to the natural one; (b) belief that man is destined to establish a personal relationship with that being (or beings); (c) certain rites and beliefs supposed to be sanctioned or commanded by supernatural reality.; (d) division of life into the sacred and the profane accompanied by various resultant activities.; (e) belief that the supernatural communicates its will and conjunctions through human messengers.; (f) the attempt to order life.. in harmony with what is believed to be the truth according to the supernatural designs; (g) belief that the revealed truth supersedes other types resulting from human efforts, so far as the most transcendental problems of thought are concerned; (h) the practice of bringing those who believe into the fold of a
community of believers thus enabling religion to pervade both individual and collective life.”

If these traits and functioning of religion were to be put concisely into a single sentence, “one would find the concept of meaning predominant. It is not fear [for example].. that motivates a genuinely religious person in his devotion: it is the sense that life has a particular meaning, and only one single meaning, which is that provided by his faith.”[1]

There are, moreover, several points which can be emphasised about the essential nature of religion, the most striking one being the sense of dependence on supra-human forces. Thus, as put by Radcliffe-Brown, “religion is everywhere an expression, in one form or another, of a sense of dependence on a power beyond man”(1956: 157). Stated differently, to underline the recognition of the supernatural, “Religion is verily a universal feature of human culture, not because all societies foster a belief in spirits, but because all recognize in some form or other awe-inspiring, extra ordinary manifestations of reality.”(Lowie 1956: xvi)

One additional point must be made here as to the most noticeable function of religion, emerging in both individual and collective human life. It is the integrative aspect of religion, that is, the function “to form a cohesive harmony for social solidarity.” [2] Thanks to this, religion, “by sacralizing and thus standardizing the other set of impulses, bestows on man the gift of mental integrity. Exactly the same function it fulfills also with regard to the whole group.”(Malinowski 1955: 53)

As a last but not least attempt at defining religion, Mardin’s elaboration is worth mentioning. In the light of recent developments in social sciences, he points out, religion can be conceptualised “as an anxiety-reducing and identity-crystallising symbolic process, and, in this sense, as a soft ideology.”(1983: 30) In his opinion, “soft” ideology here, somewhat related with religion and as compared to the “hard” one, means “the much more diffuse,
unfocused and amorphous cognitive and belief systems of mass publics.” (Mardin 1969: 193-94)

In accordance with this last, above description, then, it will appropriately be in order here to view religion in the realms of ideology and symbolism. To begin with Fromm, religion can be defined as “any system of thought and action started by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion.” (1950: 21) Likewise, meaningful as it may seem in this context, Parsons defines ideology as a “belief system”, mutually constituted by members of a society. To him, one of the important factors leading to this constitution is the institutionalisation of the belief system in the eyes of the members, within the context of their societal structure, to the effect that ideology thus possesses the function to engender collectivity among those members [3].

Moreover, “whatever the psychological functions of a belief system,” Sartori simply defines it “as the system of symbolic orientations to be found in each individual.” (1969: 400) If, on the other hand, “a religious system” is explained as made up of “a cluster of sacred symbols, woven into some sort of ordered whole” (Geertz 1973a: 129), it will be true, then, to conceive religion, like ideology, as a belief system. Accordingly, it is safe to assert that religion and ideology have certain common characteristics. In particular, ideology, when defined as “a system of symbols within the social system” (Johnson 1968: 83), helps the individual to identify himself within the categories of social and political roles since it determines to a considerable extent relationships between the individual and his environment. Within this perspective ideology, having also been defined as “a set of meaning” (Mardin 1983: 22), can be seen as one of the strategic functions of a society. In a similar vein, it can also be considered as “a map” which helps people to find and follow a direction (e.g.: Geertz 1964: 61). Religion, indeed, has many of the just-mentioned characteristics of ideology: “For example... on the cultural level, religion secures for men the possibilities of conceptual
perspective which will give them the sight, through special ‘glasses’, of the world in their environment. Within this context religion, like ideology, becomes a system of symbols.” [4]

Incidentally, theories on symbolism enumerate the basic characteristics of symbol as “its figurative quality, its perceptibility, its innate power, and its acceptability as socially rooted and supported.” The “religious symbol”, on the other hand, has indeed these same characteristics. The religious symbols are, moreover, peculiarly “a representation of that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere; they point to the ultimate reality implied in the religious act.” Differently put, they are the expression of “an object that by its very nature transcends everything in the world that is split into subjectivity and objectivity.” (Tillich 1958: 3-5)

Within the above-mentioned context, by way of conclusion, Geertz’s definition of religion is highly worth noticing, as particularly pointing to its symbolic connotation, “as a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” [5]

**Religion, Politics, and Development**

In line with the so-far-noted, inter-related aspects of religion, ideology, and symbolism, it will be apposite now to dwell at some length on inter-related aspects of religion, politics, and development in a theoretical-historical perspective. Here, the first point to be made is that, in traditional religio-political systems, “religion integrates”, as Smith pointed out, “society by providing it with a common framework of meaning and experience. Through the ordinary processes of socialization, the young acquire a common set of beliefs and values associated with symbols of the sacred. Participating in the same rituals..., members of the society are integrated at a profound affective level.”(1970: 5-6)
According to Smith’s classification, again, there are two basic models of such systems: the “organic” model and the “church” model (1970: 7-10). In the former, there is a fusion of religious and political functions, performed by a unitary structure, and the equation of religion with society is maximised. In the latter, on the other hand, one can see a greater structural and role differentiation between the religious and political spheres, but the close alliance of two distinct institutions, government and the religious body, with extensive interchange of political and religious functions. Though these two models must be seen as ideal types, it can be suggested that “Hinduism and Islam” tend strongly toward the organic model, and “Buddhism and Catholicism” toward the church model.

In the process of political modernisation history has often witnessed the disruption of traditional systems. Accordingly, it has been asserted that religion and modernisation have contents “contradictory to each other.”(Saribay 1985a: 26-7) This might be true, as this disruption is the result of the secularisation of the polity, which is one aspect of political development. Even then, religion has considerable influence on political attitudes, for “among the many factors which affect an individual’s attitudes towards the political system, religion is undoubtedly an important one.”(Toprak 1981: 14) Therefore, the traditional approach to social change and modernisation, i.e., the paradigm of uni-linear development from “traditional” to “modern”, has recently been criticised. It is seen that “the new does not necessarily eradicate the old, and that traditional symbols and institutions... do not necessarily have a dysfunctional impact upon the modernization process; on the contrary, in many instances they continue to have crucial functions within modernized societies.” [6]

Accordingly, in transitional societies which have already entered the process of development, religion is not simply a continuation of old belief systems and structures but a “re-structuring”[7] comes into being. Religious institutions may resist and/or contribute to forces of change. This is particularly so where modern political institutions are not well-
established and/or properly functioning. Religion, here, assumes several functions, therewith, becoming

“the only source of ideological content in politics. It determines the acceptable definitions of power and authority., functions not only as a mechanism of political legitimization but also as one of social integration. The religious community provides its membership with a sense of belonging and coherence. Hence political stability is maintained... more so through the integrative functions of religion.”(Toprak 1981: 12)

This functional persistence of religion as both an institution and a belief system will undoubtedly help the religion not to be an obstacle against modernisation and put it into the position of a “buffer mechanism”[8]. From somewhat different perspective, since modernisation -with its rapid socio-economic change- has produced “social atomisation” and/or an “identity crisis”, one response to overcome such strains it produced appears to be “the attempts to reconstruct new ties of solidarity and identity through the symbols, artefacts or organisations of traditional solidarities.”(Sayari 1984: 123) In this search for a new identity, to overcome alienation, “religion has not only been legitimising the reactions against modernisation but has also been successfully performing its integrative functions for social solidarity.”(Saribay 1985b: 47)

Turning now to the relationship between religion and the major aspects of political modernisation, one can see that in the definitive works on political development three major themes are identified (Pye 1966: 45-47): (a) polity secularisation: the progressive exclusion of religion from the political system, and substitution of secular modes of legitimisation; (b) mass politicisation: the process by which mass participation in politics becomes the norm and is practically realised; (c) developmental capacity expansion: the process by which the polity increases its effectiveness in directing socio-economic change.
Strictly speaking, the first theme above is a major aspect of differentiation in the development of modern political systems, and since it involves the expansion of the polity at the expense of religion in many areas of socio-political life, the ‘organic model’ of religio-political systems has certain disadvantages within this development, hence the ‘direct and negative’ relationship between religion and this first aspect of modernisation.[9] Yet, as “in organic religious system., the primary collective expression of religion is found in societal structures which regulate the entire society,”(Smith 1970: 13) systems of this type have, in turn, certain advantages over the ‘church’ systems. Thus, in the other two processes, namely, in mass politicisation and developmental capacity expansion, “the relationship with religion is indirect and partial, but positive.”(Smith 1974: 4)

At this point, if we underline -as a leitmotiv- the positive relationship of religion and mass politicisation, it will be proper to quote once more from Smith: “Granted that many secular forces and structures tend to promote the politicization of the masses., religion [does] also make some positive contribution to this process... and under certain circumstances the religious factor can be quite significant in promoting mass politicization.”(1974: 4)

**Religion and Political Mobilisation**

In traditional societies, participation in politics was almost invariably limited to a small number of individuals drawn from the high ranks. However, the process of political development has brought about changes in behaviour patterns, to the effect that “the masses are brought into the political process as participants on a more or less regular basis.”(Smith 1974: 17) Thus, political modernisation brings forth the development of “mass” politics. Indeed, the movement from traditional elite politics to mass participation politics is one of the salient characteristics of the modernisation process.

Polity secularisation, as noted earlier, is the political consequence of the disruption of the traditional religio-political system. The ‘re-structuring of religion’, on the other hand, is an
equally expected consequence. It is therefore known that “religion may contribute to the process of mass politicization by providing sacred symbols that acquire political significance. Clerical organizations, lay interest groups, and religious political parties find in these sacred symbols an important key to mass support… The ‘use’ of religion for the purpose of political mobilization can be manipulative, but it need not be.” [10]

Accordingly, it is also observed that “since the turn of the century, religious symbols, issues, organizations and leaders have played an important role in the induction of the masses into the political process. Stated in its simplest terms: in traditional societies, religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not; in transitional societies, religion can serve as the means by which the masses become politicized.” [11]

Incidentally, it should be noted that religion is not the only factor in political mobilisation of the masses. Many secular agencies and ideologies also contend for mass support and are often influential. Nevertheless, the religious factor is still of considerable importance, thanks largely to the phenomenon of “re-traditionalisation” mentioned previously, and because “it is rooted in the traditional past and in the present consciousness of the large tradition-oriented segment of the population.” (Smith 1974: 18)

As for the process of mass politicisation and the relevance of religion, there are two themes of special significance: first, the analysis of political actors related to religion, and secondly, the analysis of patterns of politicisation. To begin with the first: while modernisation happens to bring a gradual move from the elites to the masses within the political arena, in a similar vein, “the transformation of traditional religious elites into modern clerical interest groups” takes place within the religious arena. On the other hand, there also emerge western-educated intellectual elites “who regard the traditional religious elites as incapable of making necessary adjustments,” as well as lay politicians and interest groups “as
leading spokesmen for the religious interests in society” and/or “as manipulator of sacred symbols and organizer of movements which bear these symbols.” [12]

In a variety of countries, individual religious functionaries have been influential within the political arena in the process of mass politicisation. There exist, on the other hand, prominent lay politicians who have effectively utilised religious symbols in several religious traditions. As to the groups; “clerical” interest groups can mainly be identified as those that constitute official ecclesiastical hierarchies and those that are composed of a segment of the non-official clergy. Here, in the Muslim context, in particular, there are ulama associations, essentially voluntary in character and playing an important role in the politicisation of the masses. Among the religion-oriented interest groups, moreover, there are also those of a predominantly lay character.

Another type of religious interest group can be described as “non-associational”; namely, the “religious community” which becomes a political actor in societies characterised by religious pluralism. Religion, in this context, basically derives its saliency from its functioning as a symbol of group identity and self-esteem. Such religious communities come to be politicised especially in conflict situations where, more often than not, the real issues are social, political and/or economic. Accordingly, a prominent type of political party, to emerge of religious orientation, is the “communal” one [13]. The communal party mostly arises in response to the actual or latent conflict in a religiously pluralist society, its raison d’etre obviously being the protection of communal interests (In the case of the British India, for instance, the Muslim League, founded in 1906, sought to determine and defend the interests of its respective community).

As for the second theme in the process of mass politicisation, that is, the patterns of politicisation; the ‘drawing of people into active participation in the political process’ takes place when the people become conscious of ‘conflicts’ which are conceived as being relevant
to their lives. Indeed, in the Third World, the most apparent pattern in the above respect seems to be ‘the politicisation over the conflicts of religious communities’. In it, concisely put, “politization takes place as large numbers of individuals come to think of themselves as members of political collectivities determined by religious identity. Individuals perceive their personal interests as significantly related to the welfare of their religious community presently in conflict with its opponents.” (Smith 1970: 145; for details on the related patterns, 146ff)

In the above context, conflicts between religious communities have generally taken two forms –of which examples are observed in both in the Indian case: (i) the situation in which a religious community attempts to overthrow a foreign imperialist power of a different religion, and (ii) the conflict between two or more indigenous religious communities. In both, in order to mobilise the masses, religious symbols are exclusively used to promote attitudes and movements of opposition to the rivals or enemies of the community. The role of religion as a group identity in anti-imperialist movements can be exemplified at great length, a considerable number of examples being found in the first decades of the twentieth century, and the Indian Muslims’ movement representing a striking one. As for the conflicts between several indigenous communities, they have a plenty of the same characteristics as anti-imperialist conflicts. In this context, in particular, significant degree of politicisation occurs as political conflicts develop and strengthen the sense of religious group identities. The Hindu-Muslim conflict, leading in 1947 eventually to the partition of British India, is still the best historical example of this model.

**Islam as a Political Religion**

“‘man is a political animal’, and almost everything he does is colored by political behaviour. Only religion has had a deeper and more pervasive effect... and
religion often has a political dimension, as Islam clearly shows.” (al-Marayati et.al. 1972: ix)

Accordingly, employing the earlier-mentioned typology developed by Smith, Islam can undoubtedly be considered as an “organic” religion” (1970: 250), particularly since “Islamic teaching makes no differentiation between state and society, politics and religion.” (Toprak 1984: 122) This underlies the fact that political and religious functions are almost fused in Islam. That unity, in its turn, is implied by “the alleged unity of the divine and mundane realms,” (Tibi 1983: 4) and it is “neither unique nor unnatural.” Binder 1961: 11) Differently put, the integration of religion and politics in Islam, or in more precise terms, “the inherent link between Islam as a comprehensive scheme for ordering human life, and politics as an indispensable instrument to secure universal compliance with that scheme,” (Enayat 1982: 1) has so frequently been stated by students of Islam that “needs no reiteration.” (Baer 1984: 11)

Islam cannot be named only as “a political religion par excellence,” (Toprak 1984: 22) using Apter’s terminology (in detail: 1963: 57ff; 1965: 267ff). The inseparability in Islam of political conduct and religion, *siyasa* and *din*, as unceasingly argued by the Muslim conservatives (von Grunebaum 1957: 20), makes Islam appear in all spheres of societal life. Thereby it contains “an ideological formula which possesses a two-fold functioning” (Saribay 1985b: 51): by that means, on one hand, it defines for the individual his spiritual and temporal existence; on the socio-political plane, on the other, it unites the community of believers and lays down principles to build a definite socio-political order. As a consequence, “the importance that Islam theologically places on establishing a social and political structure, and basing the legitimacy of this structure on a divine power, has almost rendered Islam a political ideology… Compared with the other major religions, Islam is, in point of fact, a political religion.” (Toprak (Sayari) 1978: 175)
As a matter of fact, the above political character of Islam and its related concern with political structure is reflected by it very origins, its foundation by the Prophet of Islam. Though generally speaking “there is a common fallacy that religion and politics are two different fields of social activity. [and] this leads observers sometimes to speak of the politicization of religion, and to say that this is against the original intent of the founder of religion, or God himself” (van der Veer 1996: 268); “Islamic thought,” on the contrary, “since the precedents of the Prophet himself, has regarded physical means as indispensable to religious ends. There has been from the outset a conjunction of creed and state, of faith and polity. This of course is evident in the career of Muhammad, in the nature of the hijra and in the form of the Caliphate.” (Cragg 1965: 5-6)

In line with the just-mentioned explanation on the political character of Islam, to put it in a more clarified and broadened manner:

“…for many Muslims, Islam is a total way of life. It is not correct, according to this viewpoint, to speak of religion and politics but instead religio-politics. Islam is believed to be relevant and integral to politics, law, education, social life, and economy. These are not viewed as secular institutions or areas of life but religious (Islamic), based on the belief that Islam is a way of life, and thus religion and society are interrelated.” (Esposito 1988: 163)

As earlier noted, one conspicuous aspect of religion in general is that of ‘integration’. In this respect, in particular, Islam is all the more a great unifying force and/or possesses a strong integrative function. Thanks to this aspect the community of believers in Islam, the umma, is conceptually unified, irrespective of all differences, by the common acceptance of the divine basis of society, i.e., “a definite central figure in a single God.” (Hasan 1979: 19) This in turn facilitates the (political) mobilisation of the community, a theme which will concisely be treated in the following passages.
Islam, Religious Symbolism, and Political Mobilisation: the case of Indian Khilafat Movement

The distinguished French scholar Maxime Rodinson characterises Islam “as an 
ideologie mobilisatrice” (cited in Tibi 1983: 10), that is, an ideology which facilitates bringing to social and political mobilisation. This is genuinely related to the symbolic aspect of Islam, i.e., to the acting of Islam as a strong cohesive force for the community of believers. In other, clearer words, it is related to “the symbolic meaning Allah has, irrespective of all societal differences, among the believers.” (Saribay 1985b: 52) Indeed, as a graphic example, “the daily prayer in public renders the Muslims theoretically equal before Allah, getting them out of sectarian differences of all sorts.” [14] Needless to say, that faith and common religious experiences are of paramount importance in bringing Muslims together and in fostering a sense of unity and/or belonging to a common fraternity of Islam.

It is that symbolic aspect, integrative function of Islam, “the continuing political potency of religious symbols,” (Smith 1971: 2) or “the mobilising power of religious symbols serving as ideological formulae for political opposition.” (Tibi 1983: 11) which has been the first and foremost factor for social and political mobilisation in most of the anti-imperialist movements of the first half of the twentieth century. “The basic affirmation” in this type of ‘religious nationalism’ [15] appears to be simply “that differences in religious group identity constituted an unbridgeable chasm between rulers and the ruled, that European Christian governments had no moral right to govern Hindus, Buddhists, or Muslims, and that these illegitimate foreign rulers had to be overthrown by whatever means were available.” (Smith 1970: 146)

At this point, it should be added, in passing, that such movements of a revolutionary character, in essence, bring to “the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing
political institutions to assimilate them.” (Huntington 1968: 266) It follows that, succinctly put, “…religio-political movements function as a mobilizing force, using religion as the mobilizing ideology… Religion can reinforce political opposition by providing it with religious symbols and by attributing to it religious aims.” [16]

The explanations noted above hold largely and exclusively true for the case of the Indian Khilafat Movement. Islam, with its religious symbolism, has indeed been decisive in the political mobilisation of Indian Muslims during the development of this movement. To begin with religious symbolism, regardless of some intra-communal differences,

“Indian Muslims had a common denominator, Islam, and with it a set of symbols of solidarity: the community of believers, the ummah; its symbolic head, the Caliph; its central place of pilgrimage, Mecca; its scripture, the Qur’an; its sacred law, the shari’a; and its local reference point, the mosque. This common faith and common set of symbols offered a way to articulate a common identity based on religion, and the means for an astute set of political leaders to mobilize Indian Muslims as a political constituency.” (Minault 1982: 3; emphasis mine)

Accordingly, the Khilafat Movement --which began soon after the World War I and sought ideistically to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman state by the victorious Allies, so as to be able to preserve the most sacred symbols of Islam to which the Indian Muslims firmly attached, viz., the holy cities of pilgrimage and, much more importantly, the authority of the Caliphate, which had been “for centuries a symbol of the unity of the Moslem ummah” [17]—can primarily be defined as “a campaign by a particular group of Indian Muslim leaders to unite their community politically by means of religious symbols meaningful to all strata of that community.” (Minault 1982: 2)

The power of religious symbolism to inspire mass politicisation is admittedly the predominant feature of the Khilafat Movement. As the common denominator for the
followers of this movement, Islam, by its very nature, “has a unifying appeal for mass political mobilization.” (Toprak 1987: 219) Thereupon, it is mostly relevant here to mention Smith’s conclusion: “that Muslims in India, thousands of miles from Constantinople, could be moved so profoundly by the threat to these symbols (i.e., the holy places and the Caliphate) and mobilized in such large numbers for militant anti-government activity is a dramatic illustration of the potency of religion in the process of mass politicization.” (1974: 21)

It goes without saying, as a complementary point, that such a mass politicisation involves “communication”, since social and political actions of this kind depend “upon the flow of influence among individuals and groups in the community, through the process of communication.” (Rodee et.al. 1967: 460) In the process of communication, to shed more light on this point, the basic purpose is “the transfer of meaning”; factually speaking:

“During his entire span of life, man is preoccupied with the necessity of making himself understood and of attempting to understand others. Indeed the character and nature of his personality, the attitudes he develops, the opinions he expresses, and his success or failure in life probably depend upon his mastery of the art of communication. He must effectively convey not only facts, ideas and ideals, but also his emotions, hopes, fears, anxieties, loves, achievements, and frustrations.” (Rodee et.al. 1967: 460-61)

Such a transfer of meaning, and in turn, ‘the conveyance of facts, idea(l)s, emotions, hopes, loves, or frustrations’, have apparently taken place during the Khilafat Movement. For, above all, the threat to the Caliphate had to be explained, interpreted and/or ‘conveyed’ to the masses. Consequently, the political mobilisation of Indian Muslims has actually come into being through several means/processes of communication and under powerful religious-cum-political leadership. To put it succinctly as specified by Minault (1982: 3-4):
“During the Khilafat Movement, communication of political issues took place mostly at the local level: in the vernacular press, by oratory on the public platform, in local mosques and bazaars, by means of handbills and pamphlets, in verse, slogan, and song, by processions and demonstrations, many organized by local associations and groupings which were not primarily political, but rather were cultural, religious, or personal networks. The Khilafat leaders toured endlessly, since personal contact between politicians and populace was important, as was the ability to speak stirringly on any local grievance and to relate it to the national cause.”

By way of conclusion, various explanations for defining the movement in question can be advanced, and indeed have been put forward by several authors [18]. Nonetheless, when fully examining the movement, it will be clearly seen that the very incomplete explanation for it should undoubtedly be every one which:

“ignores the importance of religious symbols in Indian Islam, underestimates the sense of religious unity amongst Muslims --a sentiment by no means all-pervasive but still extending beyond the narrow coterie of professional politicians-- and takes no account of the religious ties between the Indian Muslims and their co-religionists in other parts of the world which provided the driving force behind pan-Islamic ideology generally and the Khilafat Movement in particular.” (Hasan 1979: 133; emphasis mine)

All in all, in a chain of relationships, if man is not only a ‘political’ but also “a symbol-using animal” (Burke 1966: 1), if the Indian Muslim man’s religion, Islam, as noted elsewhere, is both ‘a political religion par excellence’ and ‘an ideologie mobilisatrice’, and, moreover, if politics involves “the mobilisation of bias” (Schattschneider 1960: 71), then, the Indian Khilafat Movement had better be seen, in a nutshell, as a primary example for the role of religion (of Islam) in religious symbolism-cum-political mobilisation.
Notes:


(2) Alatas 1977: 217. Incidentally, within the perspective of functionalist approach, “several anthropologists have remarkably pointed to the integrative aspect of religion” as well (Vergin 1985: 9).

(3) 1964: 349ff. The expression ‘belief system’, used here, has been introduced and widely used by another political scientist, in his relevant chapter for an edited book on ideology; see: Converse 1964: 206ff.

(4) Saribay 1985a: 31. In other words, “religion has been functioning as a model for understanding a world and for orienting of the self to a definitive position within that world.” (Mardin 1983: 25)

(5) 1973b: 90. It is of relevance to incidentally note here that Levi Strauss, in his salient work on anthropology (1963), has clearly introduced into the study of religion a line of distinction by focussing on “symbol systems as conceptual models of social or other sorts of reality” (see, in particular, 167-245).


(7) “In many developing countries, social and political processes have begun to show signs of a restructuring of cultural traditions based primarily on religious and ethnic heritages… which may be called re-traditionalization.” (Sayari 1984: 121)

(8) Saribay 1985a: 29. In a stable society which maintains its social equilibrium there is a functioning of new constructions and/or a re-structuring of old institutions, which helps maintenance of the social system without falling into disruption or dis-organisation. “Buffer mechanism” is used to denote these elements which provide political change without drifting to chaos. For more knowledge, see Kiray 1964: 6ff.

(9) Parenthetically, it should be noted here that “even in societies which are politically modernized to a large extent religion is still one of the major factors which determine the political attitudes of a variety of people.” (Saribay 1985b: 63)

(10) Smith 1974: 17 (emphasis mine). As a matter of fact, historically speaking, “religious movements not only created personal bonds between participants… but also provided a vocabulary of expressive symbols. Such symbols were to become increasingly important as nationalist elites began to mobilize the countryside.” (Heeger 1974: 30)

(11) Smith 1970: 124. Smith puts it, elsewhere, in a more brilliant fashion, as follows: “Religion, a mass phenomenon in traditional societies, can play a useful role in transitional societies in making politics meaningful to the apolitical masses.” (1971: 4)


It is relevant, at this point, to also add that “the strength of their traditional ties and their success in a non-traditional setting” are two main reasons why most of the westernized elites have been able “to remain effectively integrated into their traditional communities and to exert considerable influence.” (Balandier 1970: 388)
In fact, the parties in the above context can be classified under four distinguishable categories: sect-based, traditionalist, and modernizing, as well as the communal. In more details, see Smith 1970: 137ff.

Mardin 1983: 74. It must be properly added here that, according to Tillich’s typology, the first type of “objective religious symbols” is “the divine beings and the Supreme Being, God,” that are “representations of that which is ultimately referred to in the religious act.” (1958: 14)

Karl W. Deutsch cites in his Nationalism and Social Communication (1966: 23) that “nations” have been defined variously as “spiritual unities” by Oswald Spengler, as “social souls” by Karl Lamprecht, as “mental communities” by Friedrich Meinecke, and/or as “collective personalities” by Don Luigi Sturzo. Apart from defining nations as in the one form above or another, if one defines “nationalism” as “a kind of group loyalty” (Niemeijer 1972: 2), or as “a belief, or a sense of belonging together as a nation” (Stoddard 1921: 157-58), then, the term “religious nationalism”, employed above, does really make sense.

It is of interest to note here that some significant remarks on the anti-colonial role of elites, particularly of both religious and modernizing leaders, who employ religious symbols as mobilising force, appear in Wertheim 1962: 1-14.

It is, once more, relevant here to turn to Tillich’s aforementioned typology: to him, another important group of “objective religious symbols” should be “historical objects that are drawn as holy objects into the sphere of religious objects and thus become religious symbols” (1958: 16); that seems such a typology which may well cover, within the above context, the Holy Places and the Caliphate.

Within this context, apart from few conspicuous ones cited so far, it will be interesting to note here that some authors –significantly diverging from those ones- are observed to have gone in defining that movement so far as “a purposeful agitation of some educated men in order to attain their individual goals” (as in the example of Ferrar 1932: 220-21).

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