Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared

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ABSTRACT This paper analyses forms of religious mobilisation and the resultant Islamisation in Indonesia and Malaysia after independence against the backdrop of interactions in and among three different spheres: the state, political society, and civil society. Islamisation in Indonesia has been propelled by different actors, and only from the mid-1980s until the fall of Suharto did the state apparatus control and direct its dynamics with growing intensity. Since then, the process has preponderantly been driven by civil society forces. Whereas there has been a blossoming of a diverse, yet mostly conservative Islam across the society, in the party system the Islamisation of politics has been moderate. In Malaysia, Islamisation has been much more actively planned and stimulated by the central bureaucracy. Religion in political society has been strongly politicised, while Islamic civil society organisations and groupings had a strong impact only briefly. Whereas in Indonesia civil society mass organisations have structured the discourse on Islam to a large extent and have therefore limited the ability of the state and political parties to set the agenda and mobilise Islam, in Malaysia the state and Islamic political parties have acted more independently. Authoritarian rule in Indonesia previously obstructed religious mobilisation by Islamic and Islamist parties. The brittle electoral democracy since the fall of Suharto has fuelled mobilisation efforts, but the role of the Islamic and Islamist parties has still been limited. Electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia, in contrast, has been conducive to a form of religious mobilisation that is centred upon the activities of parties.

Introduction

In Western countries, the mobilisation of political Islam and the resultant Islamisation, that is, the growing significance of Islamic activists, doctrines,
practices, and symbols, is often perceived as a threat. The debate on an alleged ‘second front’ in Southeast Asia, the Bali bombing, violent movements in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, Islamist militias in Indonesia, the civil war in Ambon defined in religious terms, hudud draft laws by PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) in Malaysia: all this has contributed to the negative image of Southeast Asian Islam in recent years. In contrast, many authors repeatedly emphasise its basically civil character (see the analysis by Hefner, 2000), that is, the fact that most Muslims have no interest in the politicisation of their religion, that Indonesian Islamist parties are relatively weak, and that the mass organisations Nahdatul Ulama (‘Renaissance of Islamic Scholars’) and Muhammadiyah (‘Followers of Muhammad’) are considered moderate and pro-democratic. Moreover, the Malaysian UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) represents an essentially secular and moderate model.

In order to understand different forms of religious mobilisation, it is essential to compare specific national trajectories and to discern several distinct development phases as well as three arenas of action. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between moderate Muslims and Islamists. In this essay, Islamism is defined by the aim of creating an Islamic state with extensive shari‘a legislation. ‘Political Islam’ encompasses Islamism, but also moderate forms of politicisation of Islam. Moreover, Islamists are divided into those who are not interested in party politics or political radicalism and prefer a slow socio-cultural transformation of society from the grassroots up; those who favour long-term change by choosing the parliamentary way; and radicals resorting to violence. It has to be underscored that Islamisation does not necessarily denote the rise of Islamism. In many instances Islamisation in Southeast Asia signifies merely the strengthening of a conservative Islam, not of Islamists.

Islamisation is described as the result of interactions in and between three different spheres or arenas: the state, political society (that is, essentially, political parties), and civil society. This differentiation serves to better identify processes and correlations and to generate hypotheses. It is also more adequate for analytical purposes than the prevalent reductionist distinction of state and society.

The comparison accentuates the different roles of actors and, more specifically, two contradictory processes. For decades, almost the whole society in Indonesia has undergone an Islamisation which was radicalised in some areas after 1998. This development has, since independence, been partially supported by the state and by political elites. The state surely has circumscribed the activities of specific religious actors. Nonetheless, for the most part this process genuinely appears to be a result of civil society dynamics. Today in the party system Islamisation of politics is moderate, whereas society-wide there is a blossoming of a – mostly conservative – Islam. In contrast, the Malaysian Islamisation was largely planned and initiated in Kuala Lumpur.
In this case, religion in the political society has been strongly politicised, while Islamic civil society organisations and groupings did have a strong impact only briefly. Whereas in Indonesia the two civil society mass organisations Nahdatul Ulama (UN) and Muhammadiyah structure the discourse on Islam to a large extent and, therefore, limit the ability of the state and political parties to set the agenda and mobilise Islam in certain ways, in Malaysia the state and the political parties (UMNO and PAS) are more insulated from civil society and act more independently. Authoritarian rule in Indonesia obstructed the religious mobilisation by Islamic and Islamist parties. The brittle electoral democracy after the fall of Suharto has fuelled mobilisation efforts. The role of the Islamic and Islamist parties has still been limited. The electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia, in contrast, has been conducive to a form of religious mobilisation that is centred upon the activities of parties.

In the following sections, the paper elaborates on analytical concepts used to interpret the rise of Islam and conceptualises the terms ‘state’, ‘political society’, and ‘civil society’. The next part examines the trajectories of Islamisation in both countries after national independence, and particularly since the 1960s. Its purpose is to determine central mechanisms and to identify major actors. The paper closes with a summary and a presentation of the most important factors separating Malaysia and Indonesia.

**Analytical Concepts of Islamisation**

In the 1960s, most modernisation theorists assumed that economic and technological change was beneficial to and dependent upon secularisation. Today, this hypothesis is viewed with reservation, especially regarding the United States and large parts of the ‘Third World’. Unexpectedly, the attitude towards Islam in majority Muslim countries has also changed tremendously. But how can we explain the increasing political mobilisation in the name of Islam? A socio-psychological approach understands the Islamic resurgence, most notably that of the student generations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a reaction to rapid social change. Due to educational expansion, tens of thousands of students moved from their villages into university cities and could only overcome their identity crises by turning to different forms of Islamic orthodoxy, that is, a strict code of conduct and a dogmatic interpretation of the holy scripts. The identity crisis was thus the product of feelings of powerlessness and humiliation in the face of an authoritarian, corrupt and ‘un-Islamic’ state; an alien urban lifestyle; and a ‘Western’-dominated world order.

Many analyses attribute religious mobilisation to the motives of self-interested actors. Islamisation can thus be, for instance, a political strategy to marginalise ethno-religious minorities. This is certainly the case in Malaysia. The federal constitution states that a Malay is a person who – in addition to
requirements concerning residence and/or descent – professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks Malay, and conforms to Malay custom. Thus, the connection between ethnicity and religion is very close. Because of that, the revivalist *dakwah*\(^8\) activists came to the fore after ethnic unrest in May 1969. The whole movement was closely linked to the subsequently enforced affirmative action policies in favour of the *bumiputera*.\(^9\)

Some works focus on the social backgrounds of the most active propagandists of Islamisation and their supporters. According to these approaches, the revaluation of Islamic principles serves the assertion of class interests. Clive Kessler (1978) and John Funston (1980), for example, consider the strengthening of PAS as an expression of peasant opposition to the hegemony of UMNO and its networks. For the most part, however, segments of the middle class sympathise with revivalism (Peletz, 1997: 264). Wazir Jahan Karim (1992: 175) emphasises the marginalisation of *dakwah* supporters, mainly middle-level urban workers, student groups or professionals without social status or power, who are marginally involved with modern development processes and generally incapable of acquiring an important platform in decision-making concerned with the government machinery or economy.

This form of Islamisation expresses, in part, opposition to the regime elites as well as the desire to stress the differences from lower and upper classes and/or traditionalist Islamic scholars.

Noorhaidi Hasan (2006: 159ff, 172ff) shows that activists of the paramilitary Islamist organisation Laskar Jihad come from different social backgrounds, but that Islamist movements in general easily recruit ‘newly urbanised youths’. Amongst these 20- to 30-year-olds are students, mostly from the faculties of natural and engineering science, and members of ‘a new proletarian class’ (Hasan, 2006: 127). Both groups live in the city under precarious circumstances and suffer from severe identity problems due to the ‘culture shock’ that results from the contrast with their previous lives in a rural habitat.

To be sure, these revivalists are mostly not labourers. According to a study by Ackermann (1991), Islamist ideologies hardly appeal to this group. Instead, as an example, a strongly westernised *Minah Karan* culture took root among female Malay factory workers in the 1970s; with ostentatious clothing and behaviour, the *Minah Karan* culture presented a counterpoint to the *dakwah* middle class. Nevertheless, radical Islamists often find support among the urban poor, at least in a few countries in the Middle East and in parts of Indonesia. Malaysia has not seen a significant mobilisation of such social classes, since economic development prevented the emergence of a large, primarily Malay ‘sub-proletariat’.
Some scholars focus on specific power relations at the national level. A specific type of Islamisation, namely the formation of, often violent, Islamist groups, can thus be a result of a tumultuous political transition and/or a collapsed state monopoly on the use of force (Sidel, 2006). In such a situation, religion may be tremendously politicised. In regard to the development of political Islam since the mid-1990s in Indonesia, Sidel, for instance, has delineated the linkage of religious institutions and identities with political struggles. Being Protestant or Muslim often means belonging to a clientelist network that disposes of government jobs and provides economic advantages (Sidel, 2006: 192). Moreover, shifting international constellations, altered configurations of authority at the national and the local level, and new ‘rules of the game’ after the fall of Suharto have entailed new strategies (‘from riot to pogrom to jihad’) by radical Islamists, their allies, and their adversaries.

Islamisation and a politically revaluated Islam are also regarded as phenomena of globalisation (Beyer, 1994; Kepel, 2002). Keddie (1998: 699f.) identifies eight global trends that have rendered ‘religio-politics’ more significant. These trends are: expansive developments in capitalism; economic crises; increasing migration; more freedom for women to determine their own lifestyles and careers; the growing power of the secular state; an expanding educational sector and continuing urbanisation; global cultural homogenisation; and improved health care with its demographic consequences. Accelerated modernisation forces large sections of the population to adapt rapidly to socioeconomic changes. Moreover, these structural shifts lead to extensive transformations of power and social relations. Concurrently, nation-states are dramatically weakened because of their dependent integration into the world market and state elites are incapable of referring to nationalist or socialist legitimisation models that have lost much of the appeal they had until the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, particular groups began to propagate Islam as a substitute ideology opposing the seemingly neo-imperialist Western countries. These groups gained influence after 1973 with the spread of ‘Petro-Islam’ characterised by Wahhabi teachings and, again, after the 1979 revolution in Iran. From this point of view, Islamisation was, inter alia, a form of resistance within the context of the North–South conflict, and a way of constructing a distinct transnational identity based on religious ideas.

The increasing interconnectedness of Muslim groups across national boundaries is an important effect of globalisation. Olivier Roy (2004) and Peter Mandaville (2005) thus stress the impact of transnationally active Islamic movements. Roy, for instance, assumes that the aspiration to ‘purity’ of a ‘globalised Islam’, with its intention of disposing of all influences of local, indigenous cultures, is a manifestation of a new transnational synthesis. In this context, the impact of new media, which may facilitate the setup of virtual networks, is discussed (Bräuchler, 2003).
Finally, standard political science literature on the political mobilisation of Islam focuses particularly on collective actors. This approach is fruitful for the comparison of Indonesia and Malaysia. The two countries share some historical legacies (Hinduism and Buddhism, late Islamisation, and the tendency towards syncretisation). Moreover, the international environment after independence and some patterns of socioeconomic development resemble each other. What is different is the role and the constellation of collective actors at the national level.

In this actor-oriented theoretical tradition, Islamisation is usually examined as a struggle between ‘state’ and ‘society’. Both sides have different intentions and strategies and attempt to either promote or prevent the politicisation of Islam (see Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Esposito & Voll, 1996; Hamayotsu, 2002, on exclusivist and inclusivist strategies of the state in relation to the society; Porter, 2002; Effendy, 2003; Abdul Hamid, 2007).\textsuperscript{10} Following this tradition, Nasr (2001), for instance, distinguishes three types of state-led Islamisation. Firstly, ‘rejectionist secularists’ (Algeria after the military coup in 1992 and Turkey immediately after the ‘soft’ coup in 1997), who have defended the decidedly secular character of the state – with excessive force if necessary. Secondly, ‘opportunist Islamisers’ (Egypt since 1971, Turkey from 1980 to 1997, Jordan since the 1950s, and to a certain degree, Indonesia during the 1990s), who have cooperated with or cautiously instrumentalised Islamic groups during specific phases but never considered Islam essential for expanding state power. Thirdly, ‘thoroughgoing Islamisers’ (Malaysia under Mahathir and Pakistan between the military coups of 1977 and 1999), where ‘Islamisation of society has occurred under the aegis of the state, and in far more thoroughgoing fashion than in Egypt or Jordan. In Malaysia and Pakistan the state became the agent of Islamisation and undertook this effort in close collaboration with Islamist forces’ (Nasr, 2001: 24). Although Nasr’s model correctly describes the main elements of Islamisation, it ignores certain subtleties. For instance, it is necessary to clearly define who these ‘Islamist forces’ are and what forms of cooperation and collaboration exist. After 1998, the Indonesia case did not match any of Nasr’s types since the model only applied to those states able to largely control Islamisation as well as political and civil society – usually authoritarian systems. Even Nasr’s classification of Malaysia as ‘thoroughgoing Islamiser’ after Mahathir had taken office misses the fact that the Islamisation in this country has been limited and that the regime still does not collaborate with most Islamists who are primarily represented by PAS.

Hence, the ‘state’–‘society’ dichotomy has to be broadened. In countries with intensive party contests and competitive elections, a political society with actors who set goals, design strategies, and have interests distinct from state or civil society actors stands out. Therefore, I follow Linz and Stepan...
Most authors mentioned offer no definition of the state. I follow Joel S. Migdal (1988) who conceptualises the state as an organisation consisting of different agencies ‘led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way’ (Migdal, 1988: 19). According to Alagappa (2004: 36), civil society comprises ‘formal and informal voluntary and ascriptive organizations including churches, labor unions, farmers’ organizations, academic and student groups, debating societies and reading groups, non-state media, NGOs, occupational associations, business federations, and sports and leisure groups’. Furthermore, he lists transnational and global organisations and movements as well as diaspora and exiled communities (as long as they influence the composition and dynamics of a country’s civil society) and social movements. In contrast, political society is an arena in which political actors, that is, essentially, political parties, compete for the legitimate acquisition and exercise of state power (Stepan, 1988).

Ramasamy (2004: 203) uses a civil society notion following Gramsci and underlines that state and civil society interests need not be conflicting. The relationship between those two sectors, political and civil society on the one side and the state on the other, is not a zero-sum game. A strengthening of the state apparatus does not inevitably imply a weakening of the other two spheres, and vice versa. Yet the state tries to dominate civil society actors through various means, succeeding only partially. The civil society sphere is characterised by a contest or struggle between different actors. Thus, according to Ramasamy, civil society is not independent of the state but rather ‘an arena of contestations between the forces of the state and the counter-hegemonic forces’ (Ramasamy, 2004: 207).

Hence, this article uses a civil society concept following Alagappa (2004) and Ramasamy (2004) and includes ‘uncivil’ groups. The following section analyses Islamisation in Indonesia and Malaysia by differentiating between several phases and based on the distinction between ‘state’, ‘political society’, and ‘civil society’.

**Indonesia**

Indonesia first went through a democratic phase (1949–57), then Guided Democracy under President Sukarno (1957–65), de facto an authoritarian regime, and the New Order (1965–98), an authoritarian and Western-oriented modernisation regime ruled by the neo-patrimonial President Suharto and...
based mainly on military power. The profoundly centralised power structure was legitimised by – non-competitive – elections and a three-party system dominated by the ruling party, Golkar. Today, Indonesia is a presidential democracy with free and fair elections, a multiparty system, and a vibrant press. The democracy has, however, several flaws. Thus, terms such as ‘defective democracy’ or ‘patrimonial democracy’ can be applied (Croissant, 2004; Webber, 2006).

The armed forces have retained their influence as veto actor in some policy areas. The legal system is ridden with corruption, human rights violations frequently remain unpunished, and the population’s confidence in federal institutions and political parties is generally low.

Islam is not the state religion because the 1945 constitution stipulates a ‘state philosophy’, the Pancasila (‘five pillars’), that recognises several religions defined as monotheistic. The form and trajectory of Islamisation are greatly influenced by an unsettled political history. Throughout the first parliamentary democracy (1949–57), Indonesia experienced a slow institutionalisation of Islam. One could perceive an increasing strengthening and professionalisation of interest representation for orthodox Muslims within the state apparatus as well as political and civil society. At the same time, the religious infrastructure was enhanced. The establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and its growth in terms of personnel, the nationwide proliferation of shari’ a courts, and the expansion of the already significant Islamic educational sector are indicators of this institutionalisation (Boland, 1971: 105ff.; Hooker, 2003; Cammack, 2007). Mass organisations such as traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama and the modernist Muhammadiyah as well as Islamic parties represented the interests of orthodox Muslims. Nahdatul Ulama was a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) as well as a party; Muhammadiyah was closely connected to the Masyumi party. The 1955 election campaign widened cleavages, especially those between secularists and supporters of an Islamic state. Nahdatul Ulama, which had a preponderantly rural and Javanese constituency, and the modernist, urban-based Masyumi (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) were, strictly speaking, Islamist parties propagating ideas of an Islamic state and intent on introducing shari’a laws. Yet, they did so in an environment that required pragmatism and the willingness to compromise. This is why they forged numerous coalitions in the national parliament with secular parties. The greatest tension, apart from altercations between the mainstream parties and the principally marginalised PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party), existed between Nahdatul Ulama and Masyumi, although the former had been part of the latter until 1952.

Parliamentary democracy failed due to the strong polarisation of political forces in a polity with limited legitimacy. In the constituent assembly, the Konstituante (1956–58), which was finally dissolved by Sukarno, the major,
highly divisive debate concerned a passage in the constitution, the ‘Jakarta Charter’. It forces all Muslims to obey shari’a law and has been fiercely disputed since 1945.

Moreover, because of a huge centre–periphery cleavage, several regionalist and Islamist movements emerged. The Darul Islam movement, for instance, originated in West Java. It was led by Kartosuwiryo, who had already proclaimed the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State Indonesia) when the Dutch attacked in 1948. Aceh rebels joined the movement in South Sulawesi and in Banjarmasin. They were put down by the military, which consequently gained increasingly more influence. Sukarno succeeded in pushing through his model of Guided Democracy supported by the military, the PKI, and the nationalist, secular PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party). The two largest Islamic parties were degraded to junior partners (Nahdatul Ulama) or banned outright (Masyumi). During this time, the attraction of secular ideologies – nationalism, socialism, and communism – was so tremendous that any dominance of political Islam was out of the question.

During the regime change in 1965/66 at least 500,000 – often only alleged – communists were killed. Many orthodox Muslims took part in the massacres. They expected their interests to be adequately represented in the new regime. Instead, the New Order elites tried hard to control political Islam (see Hefner, 2005; Porter, 2002; Effendy, 2003). At the beginning of the 1970s, a three-party system was created, dominated by Golkar as hegemon and featuring the PPP (United Development Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) as a representative of orthodox Muslim interests, but one tamed by the regime. Regarding their programmatic orientation as well as their recruitment for top positions, all Islamic organisations were controlled by the regime to a considerable degree. Many Muslims perceived this marginalisation as open discrimination. Hence, until the 1980s, the relationship between the regime and political Islam was ambivalent: on the one hand, many Muslims still supported the regime as members of Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the PPP; on the other hand, opposition to government policies and the authoritarianism of the New Order began to rise.

Beginning in the early 1970s, large sections of the population were Islamised in a process that was not actively supported by the state. A dakwah movement started in Bandung around the campus-based Salman mosque and spread in the following years to other universities (Latif, 2005: 390ff.). The educational and training methods for its members, that is the formation of small cells, were modelled after those of the Egypt Muslim Brotherhood. The related tarbiyah (education) movement began in the early 1980s at various university campuses (Salman, 2006: 190ff.).

Whereas the dakwah groups had their stronghold at secular universities, a renewal (pembaruan) movement was based primarily at the quite liberal
State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) and the State Islamic Universities (UIN) (Latif, 2005: 405ff.). The IAIN and UIN have to a certain extent bridged the divisions between traditionalists and modernists and between secularism and Islam.

The pembaruan movement that started in the late 1960s was spearheaded by Abdurrahman Wahid, who would become president of Indonesia in 1999, and Nurcholish Majid. With their so-called neo-modernist approach, which combined traditionalist and modernist elements, they intended to indigenise and secularise Islam (Barton, 1995).

What all these movements had in common was, thus, that many proponents of a political Islam withdrew from active politics and concentrated on missionary work and opinion formation. They pursued a ‘cultural’ rather than a ‘political’ Islam. This Islamisation was partly due to certain political circumstances. The ‘normalisation of campus life’ (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus) in 1978 (a euphemism for harsh controls on student organisations; the weakening of political parties; and the depoliticisation of all social organisations) resulted in a marginalisation of political Islam in political society and organised civil society. Moreover, the Pancasila was enforced as azas tunggal, that is, the only authorised ideological platform for parties and mass organisations, in the early 1980s.

At that time, the New Order elites still mainly consisted of non-Muslims; syncretists influenced by old Javanese, Hindu-Buddhist, and Sufist beliefs; and non-devout Muslims. The two latter groups are known as abangan, in contrast to orthodox santri.

Only in the mid-to-late 1980s did the regime change its course. Suharto now tended towards the santri variant of Islam. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca and began to refer to himself as Muhammad Haji Suharto. Simultaneously, financial expenses for the creation of State Islamic Universities, mosques, and prayer rooms were boosted. A new education law stipulated obligatory religious instruction in public and private institutions. Islamic courts were strengthened in matters of marriage, divorce, and heritage (Cammack, 2007). As of 1990, Muslim girls had the allowance to wear the jilbab (head-scarf) in school. Following the Malaysian example, the state established an Islamic bank. The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia), founded in 1990, was soon transformed into an important network for career-oriented orthodox Muslims. The ICMI, comprising ministers, generals, respected ulama, and intellectuals, served also to demonstrate the Islamic credentials of the regime. The same can be said of the rise of santri in the parliament, cabinet, Golkar executive board, and military leadership, a process that came to be known as penghijauan (‘greening’). In the last few years of Suharto’s reign, even Islamists, for example, from the conservative, Saudi Arabian-influenced Dewan
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Islamic Missionary Council Indonesia), were co-opted to create a counterweight to the pro-democratic opposition. Thus, state-led Islamisation was both a reaction to the embracing of religious ideals within society and a means of weakening the opposition: a conservative Islam is easily employable against alleged ‘westernisation’ and against pro-democratic forces. Furthermore, in Suharto’s neo-patrimonial system, ‘greening’ served the purpose of weakening a military faction around the intelligence chief ‘Benny’ Murdani. How far such an instrumentalisation of religion could go became evident in the last few weeks of the New Order regime when a military faction under General Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law, openly cooperated with Islamist groups.

Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, and the subsequent transition to democracy, was supported by the two large Islamic mass organisations, Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, numerous Muslim scholars and intellectuals, and Islamic student associations. In 1999, after the regime change, many Muslims expected massive electoral success for Islamic parties. Looking at the party system and the election results, however, it is obvious that political Islam is declining in comparison to the 1950s. This seems to confirm the predictions of authors such as Roy (1994) or Kepel (2002). Even the large Islamic parties with mass bases, the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) and the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), are, according to their names and self-definition, secular parties. The three largest Islamist parties have received merely a combined vote of 14 per cent (1999) and 18 per cent (2004), respectively. Even these parties never openly advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state, and their attempts to introduce the *shari’a* into the constitution failed miserably. The single Islamist party with a chance of growing into a mass party, given its previous electoral success, is the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party). It has campaigned against corruption and has avoided a public debate on issues such as *shari’a* law and the Islamic state. Thus, in order to succeed, it did not set out a religious agenda. At the party congress in August 2007, the chairman defined the PKS as a ‘nationalist party, which is religious’ (*Jakarta Post*, 30 August 2007).

The radicalisation of certain versions of Islam is noticeable outside the state and political society. This is indicated by the emergence of a plethora of Islamist groups, some of whom openly advocate violent means, and the extraordinary politicisation of religion in particular regions. Moreover, survey results imply that a huge part of the population demands an extensive, conservative, or even reactionary Islamisation (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2007). The most prominent Islamist groups are the ‘Islam Defenders Front’, FPI (Front Pembela Islam), the ‘Jihad Warriors’, LJ (Laskar Jihad), and the terror organisation JI (Jemaah Islamiyah, ‘Islamic
Community’) (see van Bruinessen, 2002; Hefner, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2001, 2002, 2007). The FPI, founded in 1998, has gained a reputation for its raids on bars and discotheques, especially during the fasting month of Ramadan. In June 2008, FPI members attacked a peaceful demonstration by liberal Muslims in Central Jakarta. Laskar Jihad was founded in Yogyakarta in 2000, allegedly in order to prevent the creation of a Christian state in the Moluccas. Several thousand jihadists were involved in the civil war in the Moluccas, several hundred in Poso, and a smaller number in Papua before the groups dissolved shortly after the terror attacks in Bali in October 2002.16 Jemaah Islamiyah, which is responsible for the Bali bombings, had already developed in the 1980s but could move more freely only after 1998. The group has been combated effectively for years now and is mostly active underground. Today, the organisation is said to consist of a few hundred members. At the other end of the spectrum, peaceful fundamentalist organisations, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (‘Indonesian Liberation Party’) and Jama’ah Tabligh (‘Proselytising Group’), have been able to increase their presence. In August 2007, for example, 100,000 people visited the national congress of Hizbut Tahrir in Jakarta, among them a range of well-known Muslim leaders (Jakarta Post, 13 August 2007). The Islamist organisation rejects violence but strives for the recreation of a caliphate. In 2000, only 5000 supporters had attended the congress.

Other examples of the growing impact of Islamists in the civil society arena are the replacements in the leadership positions of Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah; the fatwas (verdicts) of the semi-official National Ulama Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), against, among other things, ‘liberalism’; and, finally, the series of attacks on buildings of the Ahmadiyah sect, on the Network Liberal Islam (JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal), and on allegedly illegally built churches. These attacks are condoned by large sections of society, and from mid-2005 until early 2006 40 such churches were closed due to pressure from the AGAP (Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan, ‘Anti-Apostasy Movement Alliance’), which consists of 27 organisations including FPI, Hizbut Tahrir, and Jama’ah Tabligh (Bush, 2007).

Considering all these developments, the resulting picture is complex (Fealy, 2008: 34ff.). The spectrum of Islamic groups stretches from very liberal forces such as JIL to terrorist groups. At the local level, the relationships between the state, political society, and civil society often differ significantly from those at the national level. In fact, parties and local executives – and surprisingly even some secularists – have made the introduction of shari’a regulations in certain districts possible. The regulations stipulate specific clothing and behaviour for women; they ban prostitution, alcohol consumption, or gambling; and they enforce the alms tax zakat (Salim, 2007). Religious and ethnic identities have been politicised since 1998 due to increased competition for political
positions and market shares. This has given rise to numerous ethno-religious conflicts (Sidel, 2006).

On closer inspection, there is evidence that religious issues are politicised at the national level by the executive authority, as well as in the party system. Examples include the education law of 2003, which discriminates against religious minorities, and the pornography law of 2008. The law passes harsh prison sentences for ill-defined ‘pornographic’ illustrations and activities. Notwithstanding, these are exceptions. In contrast, some ministries have published very progressive draft bills (Mulia & Cammack, 2007), and in most policy areas initiatives unmistakably based on Islamist ideas are very rare. As mentioned before, the state and political society generally slow down the dynamics of Islamism in the civil society. A feeble politicisation of religion in the political society is reflected in a very moderate state religion policy. The Pancasila remains widely accepted and has in fact been extended in 2007 by including Confucianism in the course of a general cultural and political reintegration of the ethnic Chinese community.

Malaysia

Since its independence in 1957, Malaysia has been an electorally competitive authoritarian regime, differing from both ‘closed’ authoritarian systems and electoral democracy. Elections are inclusive and pluralistic, but not fully competitive and open (Case, 2006; Schedler, 2006: 3). Formal political institutions are characterised by an extraordinary constancy. The governing inter-ethnic elite coalition led by UMNO has won all federal elections. Owing to the plural voting system a narrow majority of votes has always guaranteed at least two-thirds of the seats in the national parliament.

Islam is the religion of the state. Deviant teachings, for instance Shi’ite Islam and certain Islamic sects, are banned and their adherents discriminated against. Moreover, apostasy and non-Muslim proselytising of Muslims are prohibited. Religious minorities frequently deplore temple demolitions and the difficulty of obtaining burial space. But that aside, religious freedom is generally respected. A largely peaceful inter-ethnic and inter-religious coexistence is crucial for the survival of the nation-state, so that the definition of the ideological foundation of the state with reference to ethnicity and religion is of utmost importance.

After independence, the Alliance tried to sustain the inter-ethnic elite coalition and not to politicise ethnic and religious conflicts too much. At this stage, however, official Islam and PAS Islam were not as exclusive and rigid as they would later become. The PAS tried to challenge the legitimacy of the government by politicising ethnicity and emphasising Malay nationalism. Impulses to politicise religion were still relatively weak. Although UMNO
sought to maintain an Islamic image in order to keep the Islamic opposition at bay, Islam was attributed little of the significance later given to it by the political leaders (Mutalib, 1990: 35). The UMNO was committed to promoting Islam as a moral compass but remained an essentially secular party. During this phase, Islamisation manifested itself merely in the form of newly built mosques, Qur’an recitation contests, the spreading of Islamic symbols, etc.

Malaysia has experienced an enormous revaluation of Islam similar to that in other parts of the Muslim world since the late 1960s. This process was accelerated by bloody riots following national elections in May 1969. Starting on 13 May, 196 people, mostly Chinese, were killed, according to governments reports. These confrontations led to the declaration of a state of emergency and resulted in a series of extensive reforms. Subsequently, the balance of power shifted not only within the Alliance, which integrated a few former opposition parties and became the ‘National Front’ (Barisan Nasional), but also between ethnic groups in Malaysia as a whole. The pro-bumiputera policy – that is, affirmative action favouring Malays by providing them with privileged access to administrative positions, to universities, and to state credits and concessions – was linked to a slow and cautious state-led Islamisation.

This Islamisation policy was still moderate. But at the beginning of the 1970s the regime elite began to worry about newly emerging Islamist groups. A huge part of the diverse dakwah movement (see Lyon, 1979; Abu Bakar, 1981; Nagata, 1984; Funston, 1986; Milner, 1986; Anwar, 1987; Muzaffar, 1987) originated in the largest national universities and spread throughout the entire society in multiple waves. For a few years it adopted, in contrast to its counterpart in Indonesia, the leading role in politicising Islam. Its radical proponents criticised the national political elite, which they considered to be westernised, un-Islamic, inefficient, and corrupt.

It was not until Mahathir Mohamad took office as prime minister in 1981 that comprehensive state-led Islamisation was brought about. As one of his first initiatives, Mahathir co-opted the most prominent dakwah representative, Anwar Ibrahim (Abdul Hamid, 2007: 455ff.). Almost simultaneously, ‘Young Turks’ (Fadzil Noor, Nakhia Ahmad, etc.) who had also risen to prominence in the movement took over leading positions in the PAS and set a new course for the party. They were explicitly against the ethnic chauvinism displayed by their predecessors (Mutalib, 1990: 113ff.; Noor, 2004: 329ff.). From then on, there were again public discussions about whether Malaysia should become an Islamic state and introduce hudud law. The PAS went as far as setting up a new executive committee, the Majlis Syura, to consolidate ulama power.

The discourse on Islam again shifted more into the political society. This sparked a process that is characterised by a contest between UMNO and
PAS for the ‘correct’ Islam (Malhi, 2003). At the same time, a vibrant civil society, mainly consisting of liberal nongovernmental organisations, came into being. Heterodox Islamic organisations such as Darul Arqam were marginalised and criminalised.20 The ‘Islamic Youth Movement’ (ABIM), which had emerged from the *dakwah* movement and has probably become the most influential Islamic organisation in civil society, moved closer to the regime in the following years.21

From the early 1980s on, the regime used Islamisation as an instrument to boost the Malay position in relation to ethnic minorities, especially the powerful Sino-Malaysian entrepreneurs (Mutalib, 1990: 127ff.; Abdul Hamid, 2007: 457ff.). It launched the ‘Penyerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam’ (‘Absorption of Islamic values’) campaign in the national administration. The National Islamic Religious Affairs Council, formed in 1968 and responsible for coordinating religious policies of state governments, was renamed Pusat Islam (Islam Centre) and put under direct control of the prime minister. In the years following, education was Islamised by means of additional religious instruction at schools and universities. The International Islamic University and the Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM) were created (Milne & Mauzy, 1999: 85ff.). In addition, Mahathir participated more actively in the Organisation of Islamic Conference. He propagated Islamic teachings of morality that were intended to inspire a new work ethic (Milne & Mauzy, 1983). UMNO started a systematic Islamisation policy and also proclaimed itself as one of the world’s largest Muslim parties. In parallel with these developments, PAS became significantly more radical (Means, 1991: 99ff.; Milne & Mauzy, 1983: 85ff.). Ten years after its first appearance, the *dakwah* movement had propelled a profound discursive shift in the political society.

Throughout the 1990s Mahathir questioned the pro-Malay *bumiputera* policy and began propagating his ‘Vision 2020’ of a *Bangsa Malaysia*. According to this civic nationalism the different ethnic groups are defined as Malaysians first. At least for parts of the population the Malay emphasis on a Muslim identity thus became a substitute for the waning power of ethnicity.

The conservative Islamisation continued during the 1990s – not always in accord with the objectives of the UMNO leadership. *Fatwas* of the *muftis* of the individual states have since automatically assumed the status of binding rules without having been confirmed by parliaments. Challenging such a *fatwa* can entail legal prosecution. In such an atmosphere, it has become increasingly difficult to even discuss *fatwas* or new bills. This applies to UMNO representatives as well. When *hudud* laws were adopted – but never implemented – in Kelantan and Terengganu, UMNO delegates did not vote against them even though their party had taken a firm stand on the PAS initiative.
Under the Malaysian electoral authoritarianism, state and civil society have both gained strength. The state has expanded its capacities by expanding the executive apparatus and by limiting civil liberties and political rights. In spite of these repressive measures, civil society in Malaysia has become rather powerful. This is evident when considering the number and activities of nongovernmental organisations as well as the extent of their transnational linkages. With the development of the reformasi movement in 1998, civil society became, in fact, a regime-threatening force (Weiss, 2006: 127ff.).

The reformasi coalition of opposition parties and NGOs was united by the goal of fundamentally reforming the polity.

The movement essentially pursued a secular course. Its charismatic leader, Anwar Ibrahim, portrayed himself as a liberal, open-minded Muslim. Therefore, the movement even found supporters among the Chinese and Indians. The reformist movement, the politicisation of the middle class in particular, the foundation of the new multiethnic party PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, People’s Justice Party), and especially the establishment of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious alliance (Barisan Alternatif) were all factors that substantially changed the political discourse. At first, the establishment of the alliance tamed PAS, which even agreed to work in a coalition with the predominantly Chinese and secular DAP (Democratic Action Party). This cooperation was problematic from the very beginning and eventually ended in late September 2001. The brief phase of protest was followed by a period of ambiguity. On the one hand, PAS articulated its Islamist stance more strongly than before with the publication of its reactionary Islamic State Document (Dokumen Negara Islam) and the introduction of shari’a-based criminal laws in Terengganu. On the other hand, the party repeatedly tried to work closely with the secular opposition parties PKR and DAP and was willing to soften its Islamist agenda. This is one of the reasons why moderate forces were able to rise through the ranks of the party after the 2004 election debacle (Ufen, 2009).

The UMNO, meanwhile, has continued to pursue its conservative Islamisation policies. Mahathir used the ‘war against terrorism’ to improve the strained relations with the US and to stress the menace from militants, inter alia a group called KMM (Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia, Mudschaheddin Group Malaysia). While the PAS called for jihad against America, the government cracked down on terrorist suspects and tried to lay bare the linkages to the Islamists. On top of that, shortly after the attacks on New York in 2001, Mahathir provocatively declared that Malaysia was already an Islamic state, thereby enraging liberal Muslims and the religious minorities in the country.

In spite of this initiative it can be said that in the long run the public discourse on government policies has been characterised by continuity. The assumption of office by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi in 2003 also did
not radically change the official stance. Badawi even introduced his own vague, but moderate, concept: the ‘Islam Hadhari’ (‘Civilisational Islam’) (Chong, 2006).

For the past few years, the religious state bureaucracy appears to have emancipated itself from UMNO and has itself generated some impulses for further Islamisation. The PAS and UMNO have been involved in a kind of contest since the beginning of the *kebangkitan Islam*, the all-encompassing ‘rise of Islam’. They try to demonstrate the accuracy of their respective orthodoxies and simultaneously prove the other side to be deviant. In this duel, UMNO does not lag behind PAS; this has become obvious since the 1999 elections. Johor has begun to imprison and cane people in cases of homosexuality, premarital sex, incest, and prostitution. In Malacca, female state employees, including non-Muslims, are required to cover their elbows and knees. In several federal states, the implementation of *shari’a* law has been debated. In Perlis, the Islamiah Aqidah Protection Bill 2000 (also known as the Restoration of Faith Bill) has been adopted and involves imprisonment and forced instruction for apostates. Taking these UMNO efforts into account, the political measures of the respective governments in Terengganu and Kelantan, apart from their attempts at introducing *shari’a*-based criminal laws, appear rather common (Stark, 2004).

Today, Malaysia is home to diverse political streams. Impulses to further propel Islamisation have their origins in the religious bureaucracy, partly in UMNO, in PAS, and in parts of civil society. Interrelations between these actors have become much more complex. There appears to be a boost amongst conservative-orthodox Muslims. But there has also been a certain rapprochement towards ethnic and religious minorities, and, moreover, a range of vital pro-democratic forces have evolved. Even within PAS, the faction supporting closer cooperation with the DAP and the PKR and a distancing from the discourse on the Islamic state has asserted itself.

**Concluding Remarks**

At the beginning of this paper questions about the most important actors in Islamisation, the degree of politicisation in the party system, and the political mobilisation of Islam in civil society were raised. On many occasions, it is the state itself that mobilises parts of the population for its own goals. Methods employed are the spreading of specific interpretations of Islam, reforms in the educational sector, the Islamisation of the legal and/or economic system (by means of Islamic banks, insurances, taxes, etc.), the expansion of the religious bureaucracy and the provision of the infrastructure for religious practice (mosques, prayer halls, support for pilgrimages, etc.). Another form of mobilisation takes place in political society to a considerable extent if the party system is
based on competition. A specific cleavage structure, but also the rooting of parties in religious milieus, contributes to intensified mobilisation. The third form of mobilisation originates in civil society and comprises a large variety of actors ranging from small, well-organised groups to social movements.

Significant differences between Indonesia and Malaysia are notable. To a great extent, the rise of Islam in Malaysia has been state-led. The expansion of the religious bureaucracy has strengthened the influence of central government agencies over time. Yet the civil society *dakwah* movement has provided decisive impulses for Islamisation since the late 1960s. It was also one of the reasons why Malaysia performed a political turnaround under Mahathir, who co-opted one of the leading figures of this movement, Anwar Ibrahim. Moreover, the competition with PAS in the political society is an example of a barely controllable Islamisation. Violent Islamist movements, however, have been insignificant. The slow Islamisation since Malaysian independence was, thus, first accelerated by a social movement in the 1970s, then by forces in the political society since the beginning of the 1980s. The post-1998 *reformasi* movement was essentially secular, and impulses for further Islamisation were still primarily the result of competition between UMNO and PAS. All in all, the regime has been able to contain opposition forces.

In contrast, the state in Indonesia has been unwilling to mobilise political Islam or unable to fully control the process. During the first parliamentary democracy, until 1957, a religious bureaucracy was built only slowly. The crucial controversies between secularists and Islamists were fought out in the political society arena; civil society was still weak. From 1957 until the early 1980s, Sukarno and Suharto mostly suppressed political Islam. Sukarno banned the modernist Masyumi in 1960, and orthodox Muslims were marginalised in the regime coalition. The New Order regime also sidelined political Islam for a long time. Most powerful generals and businesspeople as well as advisors to Suharto were not devout Muslims. Although the Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s and early 1980s was hardly palpable to many observers, the *dakwah* and renewal movements slowly transformed the wider society. Until 1998, however, these movements did not fundamentally restructure the political society. Only in the mid-to-late 1980s did the regime coalition try with greater intensity to integrate religious leaders and parts of the new Muslim middle class. Suharto and his closest confidants repeatedly emphasised their devoutness and provided for the ‘greening’ of Golkar, the armed forces, and the bureaucracy. Since 1998, the multifaceted revitalisation of Islam has mostly not been the result of cunning political measures implemented by rationally planning elites but rather of the interaction of several Islamic and Islamist groups and organisations as well as diverse central and regional elites. Since 1998, politicised Islam has been particularly visible outside the state and the political society.
One striking difference between Indonesia and Malaysia, thus, concerns the extent of the politicisation of religious issues within the party systems. In Indonesia under authoritarian rule political parties simply did not have the opportunity to radically politicise Islam and mobilise supporters. Today, in an electoral democratic regime, many crosscutting cleavages prevent the strong politicisation of religion in the party system. A plethora of new Islamic and Islamist parties have emerged and the main cleavage between secularists and political Islam has primarily shaped the party system. Yet from 1999 to 2002 attempts to introduce a requirement into the constitution that Muslims follow shari’ah law failed. The Pancasila compromise is still untouched, and de facto Islamic parties such as the PAN and the PKB portray themselves as secular. Besides, most clientelist parties have only shallow roots in social milieus compared to the 1950s. Islamist parties have little popular support and, subsequently, a limited ability to mobilise supporters. Politicians have a poor reputation. Whoever joins the cabinet and enters a coalition and thus belongs to the weakly legitimised ‘political class’ can hardly live up to the high moral demands of Islamic principles. The only partial exception is the PKS. Another factor is the specific form of party competition. The party system in Indonesia has not split into two opposing camps as in Malaysia (Barisan Alternatif versus Barisan Nasional). In Indonesia, ‘rainbow coalitions’ encompassing most of the major parties generally govern the country, the provinces, and the districts (see Ufen, 2008).

In Malaysia, political Islam is not as fragmented as in Indonesia. This is at least partly due to a plurality voting system. Therefore, PAS is able to present itself as the sole representative of orthodox Muslims. Because of UMNO’s hegemony, PAS can articulate maximum demands, for example, the implementation of hudud laws and the creation of an Islamic state, without ever having to realise such utopian objectives. The strong polarisation underlying the party competition engenders a further radicalisation. The PAS also forces UMNO to politicise religion. In this context, Islamisation through UMNO constitutes a boundary between Malays and minority ethnic groups and serves to protect bumiputera privileges.

With respect to civil society, it is useful to differentiate between mainstream organisations with an accommodating attitude towards the state; groups and movements which stress their independence and hold critical views on state policies; and Islamist civil society actors that militantly oppose these policies. One of the main differences between the two countries is the strength and impact of pro-democratic mainstream mass organisations. Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama arose during the nationalist awakening; they are deeply embedded in society and have developed strong links to political parties (in the 1950s NU was itself one of the main parties). They are important stabilising anchors of the new democracy. They have also institutionalised
the traditionalism vs. modernism divide in Indonesian Islam. In Malaysia such organisations never evolved due to the hegemonic role of the alliance between British colonialists and the Malay aristocratic elite and the concurrent weakness of the nationalist movement. The Islamic Youth Movement is a late phenomenon and is today a very small organisation in comparison to NU and Muhammadiyah.

Most similarities are to be found with reference to the organisations and movements that keep a distance from the state and/or that were established to protest against certain state policies or to propagate an Islam decidedly different from official and mainstream versions. One example is provided by the diverse parts of the dakwah movements; another by the myriad nongovernmental organisations encompassing even liberal groups such as Sisters in Islam (SIS) in Malaysia and the Network Liberal Islam in Indonesia. Over time, some of these groups and movements, such as ABIM, have taken the accommodating attitude of the organisations mentioned above; some belong to a third, radical stream outlined below, for instance, Darul Arqam and Jama’ah Tabligh in Malaysia or Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia.

Another obvious distinction between Indonesia and Malaysia is the impact of radical, militant versions of Islamism. In the case of Malaysia, this radicalism has been contained through a mixture of repression and restricted liberalism. Only the KMM appears to have links to international terrorist networks, but no attacks have taken place. Paramilitary Islamist groups and huge, decidedly Islamist civil society organisations are nonexistent in Malaysia. The state apparatus is able to nip radical groups in the bud since the state security forces are under civil control and the monopoly of power is effectively put into practice. In addition, ethno-religious or secessionist movements cannot fully develop due to the pronounced political and administrative centralism. The high capacity of control in terms of national security is complemented by elements of inter-ethnic and inter-religious balancing, for instance, in the multiparty government coalition Barisan Nasional. Moreover, PAS achieves electoral victories in the northern, almost exclusively Malay part of Malaysia. The Islamist party thereby diverts a substantial part of the Islamist, fundamental opposition into political society and towards limited competitive elections.

But the political control and discourse hegemony do not sufficiently explain the containment of radical Islamism. A successful economic policy producing high growth rates is also crucial. In Malaysia, this is associated with a social policy benefiting the bumiputera. The affirmative action measures of the early 1970s put most Muslims at an advantage and weakened the dakwah movement. State-led Islamisation is another factor, because it allowed for the co-opting of well-known Islamic leaders, the installation of a religious bureaucracy (Hamayotsu, 2003), and the systematic dissemination of a conservative, but still moderate Islam via mass media and the educational system.
In Indonesia, Islamist movements were mostly repressed by the New Order regime, but beginning in the 1970s revivalist movements emerged and slowly laid the foundation for a wider Islamic resurgence. In addition, the state apparatus lost most of its control capacity after 1998. The fall of Suharto coincided with the climax of the Asian crisis and intensified already existing tensions. Mass poverty and unemployment reached high levels, meaning that a massive reservoir of groups emerged that were marginalised and potentially mobilisable by radical movements. The power distribution between centre and periphery, city and countryside, capital and labour, and, finally, between ethnic and religious groups has had to be renegotiated. At times even ethnic (in Kalimantan) and religious identities (in the Moluccas) have been politicised in such a way that violent conflicts have ensued for several years. Consequently, Islamist forces have been mobilised in various organisations such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam, Hizbut Tahrir, and Jama’ah Tabligh.

Authoritarian rule in Indonesia obstructed religious mobilisation by Islamic and Islamist parties. The brittle electoral democracy after the fall of Suharto has fuelled mobilisation efforts, but the role of the Islamic and Islamist parties has still been limited. The electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia, in contrast, has been conducive to a form of religious mobilisation that is centred upon the activities of parties.

In sum, the comparison above has centred on three different regimes: Malaysia’s electoral authoritarianism, the authoritarianism under Suharto, and the electoral democracy after his resignation. Electoral authoritarianism has been the framework for well-managed and – all in all – coherent state policies on the role of Islam, accompanied by the strict control of deviant civil society actors yet with an enormous politicisation of Islam in political society. The electoral democracy in Indonesia after 1998 has been characterised by an open civil society with very diverse actors. Islam is only moderately politicised in the party system, probably because of the pluralisation and factionalisation of Islamic parties against the background of party competition marked by grand coalitions or cartels. The outcome of this form of party politics has been incoherent, but mostly moderate, state policies on the role of Islam. Under New Order authoritarianism political parties and civil society forces were emasculated and, in connection with state policies, Islam was depoliticised until the 1980s. Subsequently, the state began to promote a slow Islamisation and co-opted sectors of civil society, but it was only partially able to control some of the actors, who ultimately turned against the regime.

Notes

1. Nasr (2001: 3) defines Islamisation as ‘the greater visibility of Islamic norms, values, and symbols in the public arena, and anchoring of law and policy making in its values’.
2. ‘Hudud’ usually refers to the class of punishments (capital punishments, amputation of hands or feet, and flogging) that are fixed for certain crimes such as drinking alcohol, theft, robbery, illegal sexual intercourse, rebellion, and apostasy (including blasphemy).

3. Islamic law of which hudud laws are only a part.

4. Political Islam must be viewed against the background of goals aspired to and means employed. In this vein, Dekmejian (1988: 3ff.), distinguishes between adherents to political Islam that are revolutionary, gradualist, or messianic. The International Crisis Group (2005) has a similar approach: it differentiates three forms of Sunni Islamist movements – political, missionary, and jihadist – regarding their methods (violent or non-violent) and goals (political or mostly non-political).

5. This also encompasses the ‘commodification of Islam’, that is, the growth of Islamic financial, marketing, publishing and retailing sectors and the activities of popular preachers with their own numerous businesses (see on this Fealy, 2008).


9. Officially, the so-called bumiputera (‘sons of the soil’) include Malays (about five-sixths of the bumiputera) and other indigenous ethnic groups such as the Dayak, Melanau, Bajau, Kadazan, and Murut.

10. See also Burgat (2003: 54ff.), who distinguishes – like Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy – ‘Islamism from above’ and ‘Islamism from below’.

11. See also on this distinction Weiss (2006: 248). She primarily analyses the role of civil society agents.


13. Besides Islam, these are Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. The two latter ones are counterfactually defined as monotheistic religions. In early 2007, Confucianism was added to this catalogue.


15. Today, these terms are used much more carefully because of the expansion of orthodox Islam, the so-called santrinisasi, and the pluralisation of Indonesian Islam. These processes have blurred some of the old divisions.

16. Laskar Jihad was able to travel to Ambon without restrictions and was probably supported in its activities in the Moluccas by parts of the military and powerful financiers.

17. Nevertheless, there are tendencies of an increasing authoritarianism (see Slater, 2003). Slater underlines the progressive personalisation of power, that is the growth of ‘despotic power’ (the ‘iron fist’) against the background of huge and not diminishing ‘infrastructural power’ (the ‘iron cage’) under Mahathir.

18. The last census in 2000 showed that 60.4 per cent of the population were Muslims (almost exclusively Malays); 19.2 per cent Buddhists; 9.1 per cent Christians; 6.3 per cent Hindus; and 2.6 per cent Confucians, Taoists, or adherents to other Chinese belief systems.

19. The National Front (Barisan Nasional) currently consists of 13 parties. Besides UMNO the most important ones are the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).

20. Darul Arqam (‘House of Arqam’, named after a companion of the prophet) was founded in 1968 and led by Ashaari Muhammad. In 1972, its leaders established a commune near Kuala Lumpur. This tremendously successful organisation was banned in 1994.
21. According to Hassan, the weakness of the PPP in Indonesia entailed a certain radicalisation of the HMI, whereas ABIM, in contrast to PAS, regarded the political situation ‘as inhospitable, if not wholly un conducive, to the strengthening of Islam in the country’ (Hassan, 1987: 193).

22. The reformasi movement originated at the height of the Asian crisis in 1998 following the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, the deputy of Prime Minister Mahathir. Anwar was accused of corruption and sodomy, charges which later landed him in jail for six years.

23. During its early years it was still called Parti Keadilan Nasional, National Justice Party.

24. These laws were overruled immediately afterwards by the federal government.

25. Later, government representatives spoke of the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Militant Group Malaysia).

26. This is indicated by a survey that was conducted among more than one thousand Muslims in December 2005 (see Martinez, 2006).

References


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