

Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered

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First published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset's essay, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," has proved one of the most controversial, durable, and frequently cited articles in the social sciences. Asserting a broad and multistranded relationship between economic development levels and democracy, it broke new ground in what came to be known (quite often disparagingly) as "modernization theory" and became an essential reference point, typically the *starting point*, for all future work on the relationship between political systems and the level of economic development.

Lipset's general argument was simply "that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1960, p. 31).¹ To demonstrate his argument, he classified the countries of Latin America, Europe and the English-speaking democracies into two sets of two groups each, based on their experience with democracy: for Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, stable democracies versus unstable democracies and dictatorships; for Latin America, democracies and unstable dictatorships versus stable dictatorships. Within each region or set, he then compared the two groups of regimes on a wide range of indicators of socioeconomic development: income, communications, industrialization, education, and urbanization. Not surprising (from the perspective of anyone having even the most casual acquaintance with the profusion of analyses that have followed), he found that within each regional set, the more democratic countries had consistently and often dramatically higher mean levels of development than did the less democratic countries.

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Lipset's analysis can and has been criticized on a number of conceptual and methodological grounds. It is a static analysis of data from a single time point, although it does classify regimes on the basis of their experience over a long period of time (25 to 40 years). Like other theories in the modernization or "liberal" school, it assumes linearity, ignoring the possible negative impact on democracy "that the processes of changing from one developmental level to another might have" (Huntington & Nelson, 1976, p. 20). It only establishes correlation, not causality, yet it does assume and infer that democracy is the consequence of these various developmental factors. It shows the correlation of democracy with a wide range of developmental variables, but it does not present a truly multivariate analysis in which the independent causal weight or correlational significance of each variable is established by controlling for the other variables. Of course, Lipset was writing before the social sciences began employing multiple regression analysis (not to mention dynamic analyses like event history). But even with the methods of the time, no attempt was made to control for other factors (except region) or to test them in interaction with one another. However, Lipset did emphasize—and demonstrate with data from Lerner's (1958) study of modernization in the Middle East—that the various developmental variables "are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy."

There was also a problem of substantive interpretation that has been less frequently noted. Although the decomposition of the sample into two parts can be justified as an attempt to control for cultural and regional variation, it produced a striking anomaly that Lipset did not analyze: On 11 of the 15 development variables for which he presented data, the European *non-democracies* (and unstable democracies) had higher mean levels of development than did the Latin American *democracies* (and unstable dictatorships). In fact, on most dimensions, these differences were quite large, often as large as the differences between the more and less democratic groups *within* regions. Only on urbanization did the more democratic Latin American group rank consistently more "developed" on average than the more authoritarian European group, and these differences were relatively small.

On first glance, it would be tempting to attribute this anomaly to the noncomparability of the criteria for dichotomizing the two sets of countries. As a result, the *less* democratic European category—"unstable democracies and dictatorships"—overlapped conceptually to a considerable degree with the *more* democratic Latin American category—"democracies and unstable dictatorships." However, conceptual overlap does not entirely account for the anomaly. Of the 7 Latin American "democracies and unstable dictatorships," 5 (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) had democratic

systems in 1959 (and those in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay had each been in place for at least 10 years). Of the 17 European “unstable democracies and dictatorships,” 10 were stable dictatorships (most of them Communist).² Had Lipset compared these two conceptually distinct categories—Latin American democracies and European dictatorships—he would have found the latter to have notably higher levels of economic development than the former, significantly qualifying his asserted relationship between economic development and democracy.³ For example, the 10 European dictatorships had an average literacy rate in 1960 of 87%, compared to 80% for the 5 Latin American democracies. Their per capita GNPs averaged \$598, compared to \$428 for the Latin American democracies. On a particularly valuable index of development not available when Lipset was writing, the “physical quality of life,” the mean level for the European dictatorships was 8 points higher than that for the Latin American democracies: 89 versus 81.⁴ Had the comparison been broadened to “Third World democracies,” including India and Sri Lanka in particular, the gap with European dictatorships would have been even more striking.

This modest reinterpretation of Lipset’s analysis also heightens the strength of his relationship in a different sense. Within Europe, there is a clear step pattern among the three groups of countries that emerge when, in addition to the “stable democracies,” we separate “unstable democracies” and “dictatorships.” As expected, the mean development level increases substantially with each step toward stable democracy.⁵ As I show later, a more striking stepwise progression is apparent when we examine the relationship between development and a more refined typology of regime democraticness.

Thus the data around 1960 offer some impressive support for Lipset’s thesis of a direct relationship between economic development and democracy, but within Lipset’s comparative data were also some strong indications of the limits to this relationship. Region (and all it stands for in terms of cultural and social conditions) was an important intervening variable (most of the stable European dictatorships were in *Eastern Europe*). That development level was hardly completely determinative was also indicated by the considerable overlap in ranges of development levels between the more and less democratic groups within each region. On every developmental variable, there were countries in the less democratic group with a higher level of development than countries in the more democratic group.⁶

In fact, what Lipset showed in his famous article—and all he intended or claimed to show—was a correlation, a (linear) causal *tendency*. Before even presenting his main thesis, he conceded that “a syndrome of unique historical circumstances” can give rise to a political regime form quite different from what would be favored by “the society’s major (developmental) characteris-

tics" (p. 28). Moreover, once having arisen for whatever unique historical reasons, "a political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the *emergence* of that form" (p. 28, emphasis in original).

In this essay, I reevaluate Lipset's thesis on the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy more than 30 years after its formulation. This is certainly a propitious moment to undertake such a reassessment. For one thing, there are many more democracies in the world today, especially among the less developed countries. In the midst of this "third wave" of democratization in the world, there were in 1990, by the count of Huntington (1991, p. 26), 58 democracies in states with more than 1 million population, compared to only 36 in 1962 when the second wave of democratization came to an end.⁷ This democratic expansion follows a "second reverse wave" of democratic breakdowns in the 1960s and 1970s, which was seen by a number of political scientists, especially those working with the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" model (Collier, 1979, O'Donnell, 1973), to negate Lipset's thesis. Today, that reverse wave has itself passed, and European decolonization has been almost entirely completed (bringing more than 70 new states into the world since Lipset first published his article in 1959). With many more states, over 30 more years of regime change and persistence, and an impressive accumulation of social science research addressed to this thesis, the time is ripe for a reevaluation.

A GENERATION OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Following Lipset's essay, a vast number of quantitative studies, using a wide range of methods, have examined the relationship between democracy and many different dimensions of socioeconomic development. Almost all of them have found a positive relationship, and the weight of the evidence suggests that, in the conclusion of one of the more systematic and sophisticated studies, "level of economic development appears to be the dominant explanatory variable" in determining political democracy (Bollen & Jackman, 1985, p. 42).

CROSS-TABULATIONS

A number of scholars over the years have done cross-tabulations of economic development and democracy for a variety of samples and time points, and all of them have strongly supported Lipset's thesis. While this method is unable to establish causality, much less to model its paths or

determine its linearity, it can clearly demonstrate interdependencies among variables. Various cross-tabulations have done this rather strikingly for the overall relationship between economic development and democracy. Using an approach similar to Lipset's but even more comprehensive, Coleman (1960) divided 75 "modernizing political systems" into three categories—competitive, semicompetitive, and authoritarian regimes—which he then related to 11 different indicators of national wealth (economic development), industrialization, urbanization, and education. In each of his two regional sets, Latin America and Africa-Asia, the ranking of regime types conformed almost perfectly to the expected pattern: Countries with competitive regimes had the highest levels of development, semicompetitive countries the next highest, and authoritarian countries the lowest. Remarkably, on only one variable (unionization), did the development data deviate even slightly from the expected step pattern.⁸ Cross-tabulating the same three regime types with 5 "stages" of economic development (for 89 countries at all levels of development), Russett (1965, cited in Dahl, 1971, p. 65) found that all of the 14 countries in the highest stage ("high mass consumption") were democratic, 57% in the next highest stage, but only 12% to 33% percent in the lower three stages. Significantly also for Lipset's thesis, Russett justified his classification of countries into broad development stages by demonstrating high intercorrelations among the various dimensions of social and economic development. (These high intercorrelations have also been found by Cutright, 1963; Olsen, 1968; Powell, 1982; and virtually all other such analyses.)

Cross-tabulating Russett's same 5 stages of development with the 29 polyarchies that he identified in 1969, Dahl (1971, p. 66) found again that all highest-level countries are polyarchies, with the percentage dropping to 36 in the second highest ("industrial revolution") group, and negligible below that (only 2 of the 57 countries in the three lowest development groups qualified as polyarchies in 1969). This led Dahl to offer an important and influential extension of Lipset's hypothesis, which he stated in the form of two propositions:

Proposition 1. "There exists an upper threshold, perhaps in the range of about \$700-800 GNP per capita (1957 U.S. dollars), above which the chances of polyarchy . . . are so high that any further increases in per capita GNP [and associated variables] cannot affect the outcomes in any significant way."

Proposition 2: "There exists a lower threshold, perhaps in the range of about \$100-200 GNP per capita, below which the chances for polyarchy . . . are so slight that differences in per capita GNP or variables associated with it do not really matter." (pp. 67-68)

A recalculation by Diamond (1980, p. 91; see also Lipset, 1981, p. 471), using Freedom House data for 1977 and per capita GNP figures for 1974, again divided the countries for which there were data (now 123) into 5 quintiles of economic development. Three fourths of the 25 wealthiest countries were democratic (or "free" by the rating of Freedom House); the remainder were Arab oil or communist states. A third of the countries in the second category (with per capita GNPs ranging from \$740 to \$2,320) were democratic. Below the 50 richest countries, there were only 4 democracies among the remaining 73 states (about 5%).

Finding a similar pattern in 1981, Huntington (1984) was led to extend Dahl's extension one step further. If so many cross-tabulations at successive points in time kept showing with such consistency apparent upper and lower thresholds for the likelihood of democracy, then it made sense to conceptualize the developmental space between them as "a zone of transition or choice, in which traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society and to implement public policies in such a society" (p. 201). If Huntington's logical extension of the theory was correct, most democratic transitions should be occurring at this middle level of economic development because "in poor countries democratization is unlikely; in rich countries it has already occurred" (Huntington, 1991, p. 60). In fact, Huntington has demonstrated this to be the case with the democratic transitions of the third wave: "About two-thirds of the transitions were in countries between roughly \$300 and \$1,300 in per capita GNP (1960 dollars)." Counting all 31 countries that experienced either democratization or significant political liberalization between 1974 and 1989, Huntington found half of them to lie in the middling range of \$1,000-\$3,000 per capita GNP in 1976. Amazingly, "three-quarters of the countries that were at this level of economic development in 1976 and that had nondemocratic governments in 1974 democratized or liberalized significantly by 1989" (Huntington, 1991, pp. 62-63). These transitions "corrected" many of the most anomalous locations of more developed countries with respect to regime type: By 1990, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia had all become democratic, and the Soviet Union and Bulgaria were at least heading in that direction.

The cross-tabulations to date have been conducted with a very simple categorization of regimes into democracies and nondemocracies, at most including semidemocracies. The real world, of course, presents a more continuous range of variation on the principal dimensions of democracy—competition, participation, and liberty.⁹ These dimensions are closely

(though not perfectly) captured by Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties in every country of the world. Each country is rated from 1 to 7 on each of those two measures, with 1 being *most free* and 7 *most authoritarian* (Freedom House, 1991, pp. 53-54).¹⁰ Using this combined 13-point scale of what I will call "political freedom," I have proposed a typology of 7 regime types, moving in step fashion from the most highly closed and authoritarian to the fully liberal and institutionalized democracies (Diamond, 1991). Cross-tabulating these 7 regime types with economic development levels enriches our understanding of the pattern of association at this moment of peak democratic expansion in world history.

Table 1 presents a cross-tabulation of per capita GNP in 1989 (broken down into the World Bank's four national income groups) and regime type in 1990 for 142 countries (unfortunately, a number of communist countries are omitted because of lack of GNP data). It shows, once more, a strong apparent relationship between economic development and democracy. Two aspects of this cross-tabulation (and that in Table 2) add to its importance for cumulative research. First, as just noted, it examines the association with 7 regime types rather than just two or three. And second, the data have been tested for statistical significance with two forms of the chi-square test, both of which show the association to be highly significant at the .0001 level.

Looking first at income groups, we see in Table 1 that over 83% of the high-income countries have competitive, essentially democratic regimes (that is, one of the three most democratic regime types). Four countries in this income group have highly authoritarian regimes, but they are all Persian Gulf oil states whose income vastly overstates their real levels of socioeconomic development. Outside the Gulf, Singapore is the only high-income country that is not democratic. Interestingly, there is less difference than we would expect between the upper-middle- and lower-middle-income countries. It is in fact the *upper-middle-income* countries that have the higher proportion of very authoritarian (state hegemonic) regimes, but four of these 5 are again Arab oil states (the other is Romania, which has since experienced further political opening). The two groups have the same proportion of democracies (about half of the total), but the upper-middle-income countries, as expected, have a higher proportion of more fully democratic states. In accord with Lipset's thesis and all its extensions, only three low-income countries are democratic—India, Gambia, and the Solomon Islands (in ascending order of democraticness)—and the latter two have less than 1 million population, a size that seems more conducive to democracy.¹¹ Two other low-income countries—Sri Lanka and Pakistan—were democratic in recent years but deteriorated to semidemocratic status. (Haiti lasted in the "democratic" category during 1991 for all of 8 months.) Strikingly, large

TABLE 1: Freedom Status (1990) and Per Capita GNP (1989)

Regime Type	Per Capita GNP				Total
	High Income	Upper-Middle Income	Lower-Middle Income	Low Income	
State hegemonic, closed (13-14)	2	2	2	13	19
	10.5%	10.5%	10.5%	68.4%	100.0%
	6.7%	11.1%	4.1%	28.9%	13.4%
State hegemonic, partially open (11-12)	2	3	3	18	26
	7.7%	11.5%	11.5%	69.2%	100.0%
	6.7%	16.7%	6.1%	40.0%	18.3%
Noncompetitive, partially pluralist (10)	0	1	5	5	11
	—	9.1%	45.4%	45.4%	100.0%
	—	5.5%	10.2%	11.1%	7.7%
Semicompetitive, partially pluralist (7-9)	1	3	14	6	24
	4.1%	12.5%	58.3%	25.0%	100.0%
	3.3%	16.7%	28.6%	13.3%	16.9%
Competitive, partially illiberal (5-6)	1	1	12	1	15
	6.7%	6.7%	80.0%	6.7%	100.0%
	3.3%	5.5%	24.5%	2.2%	10.6%
Competitive, pluralist, partially institutionalized (3-4)	5	6	12	1	24
	20.8%	25.0%	50.0%	4.1%	100.0%
	16.7%	33.3%	24.5%	2.2%	16.9%
Liberal democracy (2)	19	2	1	1	23
	82.6%	8.7%	4.3%	4.3%	100.0%
	63.3%	11.1%	2%	2.2%	16.2%
Total	30	18	49	45	142
	21.1%	12.7%	34.5%	31.7%	100.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

NOTE: Chi-square measures are significant beyond the .0001 level by both the Pearson and likelihood ratio methods. Numbers in parentheses after regime type represent the range of scores on the Freedom House combined scale of "political freedom." The first figure in each cell is the raw number of cases; the second figure is the row percentage; the third figure is the column percentage.

SOURCE: Freedom House (1991); World Bank (1991, Table 1).

proportions (almost 70%) of the two most authoritarian regime forms were concentrated in the low-income group of countries.

Per capita national income, or gross national product (GNP), is the development variable most often tested in association with democracy (whether by cross-tabular, correlational, or multivariate analysis). However, it has a number of drawbacks and limitations, including the difficulty in estimating the money incomes of communist countries (without the benefit

of market prices) and of many developing countries (where so much economic activity takes place in the informal economy), as well as the exaggerated development levels indicated for the principal oil-exporting states. In addition, the *mean* national income of a country tells us nothing in itself about its distribution, and because money income can be far more unequally distributed than years of life expectancy or schooling, per capita figures for GNP are less reliable indicators of average human development in a country than are national averages for the latter nonmonetary types of measures. These problems are attenuated when we examine indices of development that either exclude monetary measures, such as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI),¹² or combine per capita GNP with such nonmonetary indicators of human welfare as literacy and life expectancy.

Just such a measure, the Human Development Index (HDI) has been developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1991). It represents an unweighted average of three (standardized) measures: adult literacy, life expectancy, and (the log of) per capita GDP.¹³ It has the advantage of availability for almost all countries in the world (capturing a number of countries not included in Table 1), and greater validity in indicating real levels of human well-being. As is readily apparent in Table 2, the relationship between democracy and development is even stronger when the HDI is used as the development indicator and the universe of nations is decomposed into five development levels instead of four.¹⁴ In particular, some of the most glaring anomalies fade or disappear. All of the 20 most developed countries are concentrated among the two most democratic regime types, and 85% of them fall into the *most* democratic regime type. More significantly, in comparison with the cross-tabulation for per capita GNP, the HDI shows a more perfect step pattern of association with regime democraticness through the middle levels of development. The medium-high countries have a higher proportion of democracies, and especially of more fully democratic democracies, than do the medium countries, which are scattered across all regime types, with semicompetitive regimes being the mode. Medium-development countries, in turn, are more democratic than the medium-low countries, which range from state hegemonic to somewhat democratic and yet are still more democratic than the overwhelmingly authoritarian low-development countries. Of the 57 countries that are low or medium-low in development, only 1, tiny Gambia, scores even in the second most democratic regime type (see appendix).¹⁵ At the authoritarian end of the scale of regimes, the association also works in reverse much more regularly than for per capita GNP. The highest proportion of state hegemonic regimes (77%) is found among the low-development countries, followed again in step

TABLE 2: Freedom Status and Human Development Index, 1990

Regime Type	Human Development Index					Total
	High (Top 20) ^a .993-.951 ^b	Medium-High (21-53) .950-.80	Medium (54-97) .796-.510	Medium-Low (98-128) .499-.253	Low (129-160) .242-.048	
	State hegemonic, closed (13-14)	0 —	2 9.1%	7 31.8%	2 9.1%	
State hegemonic, partially open (11-12)	0 —	3 10.3%	6 20.7%	7 24.1%	13 44.8%	29 100.0%
Noncompetitive, partially pluralist (10)	0 —	0 —	3 27.3%	5 45.4%	3 27.2%	11 100.0%
Semicompetitive, partially pluralist (7-9)	0 —	6 24.0%	10 40.0%	6 24.0%	3 12.0%	25 100.0%
Competitive, partially illiberal (5-6)	0 —	3 18.8%	7 23.3%	6 23.0%	0 9.7%	16 16.4%
Competitive, pluralist, partially institutionalized (3-4)	3 12.0% 15.0%	13 52.0% 40.6%	8 32.0% 18.6%	0 —	1 4.0% 3.2%	25 100.0% 16.4%
Liberal democracy (2)	17 70.8% 85.0%	5 20.8% 15.6%	2 8.3% 4.6%	0 —	0 —	24 100.0% 15.8%
Total	20 13.2% 100.0%	32 21.1% 100.0%	43 28.3% 100.0%	26 17.1% 100.0%	31 20.4% 100.0%	152 100.0% 100.0%

SOURCE: Freedom House (1991); United Nations Development Program (1991, Table 1).

NOTE: Chi-square measures are significant beyond the .0001 level by both the Pearson and likelihood ratio methods. Numbers in parentheses after regime type represent the range of scores on the Freedom House combined scale of "political freedom." The first figure in each cell is the raw number of cases; the second figure is the row percentage; the third figure is the column percentage.

a. Numbers in parentheses in row are the range of country rankings on Human Development Index.

b. Numbers in row are the range of scores on the Human Development Index.

pattern by the medium-low countries (35%), the medium (30%), and the medium-high (6%).

As a comparison of the two tables suggests, the HDI shows a substantially higher correlation (.71) with the combined index of political freedom than

does per capita GNP (.51). (The correlation between the two development measures is .66, which means they are strongly associated but that more than half of the variance of each is explained by other factors.) Two important conclusions should be drawn from these two correlations. First, it is a country's mean level of "human development" or physical quality of life, more than its per capita level of money income, that better predicts its likelihood of being democratic and its level of political freedom. This is consistent with multivariate statistical analyses that have showed the PQLI to be even more strongly associated with democracy than per capita GNP. It also is consistent with the logic of Lipset's argument, as I will argue in the final section of this essay. One reason why the HDI correlates with the freedom index more closely than does per capita GNP is because many democracies in the developing world rank significantly higher on the HDI than they do on per capita GNP; this gap is especially large for Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Mauritius, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and (semi-democratic) Sri Lanka (UNDP, 1991, Table 1). In other words, the physical quality of life for their citizens (in life expectancy, literacy, and so on) is significantly beyond what would be predicted purely by their level of economic development.¹⁶

Second, the moderate correlation between per capita GNP and political freedom (lower than those found in many earlier studies discussed shortly) may indicate that the relationship between economic development and democracy has weakened somewhat in the last 30 years as the number of democracies, especially in the middle ranges of development, has grown, especially in the past few years. Although differences in the measures of democracy are obviously important here, I believe the more important factor has been real change in the world, "globalization of democracy, in terms of the near-universalization of popular demands for political freedom, representation, participation, and accountability" (Diamond, 1992b). While this change may be eroding, or at least temporarily challenging, what both Dahl and Huntington identified as a lower development threshold for the viability of democracy, it only reinforces the upper threshold, as evidenced both in the universality of democracy among the high-HDI countries and by the fact that above about \$6,100 per capita (1989), only three countries were undemocratic in 1990 (Singapore, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates).

Interestingly, many of the countries whose placement in Table 2 is roughly as predicted by the overall correlation are recent arrivals to their regime type—that is, products of the third wave of democratization. One could argue, with Huntington (1991), that two historic changes account for this: the relatively swift and sudden collapse of a *nondevelopmental* barrier to democratization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—the authoritarian intran-

sigence of the Soviet Communist Party—and the sheer passage of time, enabling “political development” in countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, South Korea, and Taiwan to catch up to their levels of socioeconomic development. In fact, Huntington (1991) argues, “In considerable measure, the wave of democratizations that began in 1974 was the product of the economic growth of the previous two decades” (p. 61).¹⁷

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES¹⁸

Cutright’s (1963) study was the first to use correlational analysis to test the Lipset hypothesis. His index of democratic stability correlated most highly with his index of communication development (.81), but measures of urbanization, education, and industrialization also showed high positive zero-order correlations with political development (.69, .74, and .72, respectively) and even higher intercorrelations with one another. The multiple correlation of these four aspects of socioeconomic development with Cutright’s democracy index was .82 (meaning they accounted for about two thirds of the variance)—giving strong support to Lipset’s thesis of a broad, multistranded association between development and democracy.

Cutright labeled his regime index “political development” but in combining measures of multiparty competition and stability, he was correctly seen to be measuring “democratic stability” and in later writings he referred to the same index as “political representation.”¹⁹ This index was subsequently used (partially or entirely) in a number of other quantitative studies (Coulter, 1975; Cutright and Wiley, 1969; Olsen, 1968), so it is important to acknowledge Bollen’s objection (1980, pp. 374-375; 1990, pp. 15-17) that combining measures of stability with measures of democracy raises important conceptual and methodological problems: By averaging out possible sharp swings in levels of democracy, it may obstruct the study of political change and confound the interpretation of correlations.

Using both the Cutright index of political representation and an alternative index that did not incorporate stability over time,²⁰ Olsen (1968) found strikingly similar results to Cutright’s on a larger sample of countries (115 as opposed to 77). Both Cutright’s scale and Olsen’s own showed consistently strong correlations with a number of different (multivariable) dimensions of socioeconomic development, ranging from .59 to .71. In addition, Olsen found that his 14 socioeconomic variables collectively had a multiple correlation with political development/democracy almost identical to what Cutright found (.83 for the Olsen index and .84 for the Cutright index). Given the quite different composition of the two political indices (and particularly their difference in incorporating the stability dimension), it is all the more

striking that their correlations with the various development indices were virtually identical (Olsen, 1968, p. 706; see also Table 3 here).

In 1969, Cutright and Wiley took an important methodological step by examining only those countries that were continuously self-governing from 1927 to 1966 (excluding the effects of colonial rule and foreign occupation). Dividing these 40 years into 4 successive decades, they examined the relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development in each decade and applied a "cross-lagged" correlational test. In doing so, they found not only a consistently strong positive association between democracy and social and economic development in each decade but grounds for inferring a causal path from economic development in particular to democracy. The additional finding that changes in political representation (in effect, democracy) only occurred where social security provisions were low and literacy high led them to modify Cutright's earlier presumption of a simple linear relationship. The provision of social security (and more broadly, the meeting of economic expectations and needs) appeared to give stability to all constitutional forms. This finding anticipated in some ways that of Hannan and Carroll (1981) discussed later.

By the late 1960s, other scholars were also becoming concerned with attempting to establish causality. McCrone and Cnudde (1967) built on the earlier work of Lerner (1958), Lipset (1960), and Cutright (1963) in testing different causal paths among the variables using the Simon-Blalock method (which infers causality from the patterning of cross-sectional correlations over time). The model that they found best fit Cutright's data begins with urbanization, which increases education and also has a small direct effect on democratization. Education, in turn, they found, stimulates the expansion of communication media, which then has a large direct effect on democratization.²¹ More direct evidence for this causal path was produced by Winham's (1970) longitudinal study of the United States, which used as an indicator of democracy in each decade the Cutright representation index combined with a measure of participation (the average percentage of the population who voted in presidential elections). Winham also found positive correlations between communication, urbanization, education, and democratization strikingly similar to Cutright, but by using time-lagged correlations over a long span of time, Winham was able to infer more persuasively that socioeconomic development had a causal effect on democratic development. Specifically, he found that the data pointed to the causal priority of education and especially (again) communication.²²

Using similar time-lagged correlations for 36 European, North American, and Latin American nations, Banks (1970) found a very different pattern. His scale of democratic performance (measuring how the chief executive is

elected, the effectiveness of the legislature, and the extent of the franchise) was positively correlated with socioeconomic development throughout the period 1868 to 1963, but he inferred from the patterning of time-lagged correlations that if there was a causal relationship between development and democratic performance it was more likely that it ran in the reverse direction. This method is open to serious question, however, raising doubts about the findings of all the studies that employed it.²³

Jackman (1973) developed a more continuous measure of democratic development, merging simple categorical measures of the presence of democratic structures with the continuous measures of participation and freedom of the press in 1960. Comparing linear with curvilinear models of the effects of economic development (per capita energy consumption) on his scale of democratic performance, he found two curvilinear models to fit much better than the linear one.

Jackman's contribution was significant in part because it tested a scale of democracy that was not "contaminated" with a measure of stability over time. In fact, Jackman subsequently showed that the heavy reliance on political stability in Cutright's (1963) measure of political representation could produce a spurious analytical result (in this case, concerning the relationship between political democracy and social equality; Jackman, 1975, pp. 86-87; see also Bollen, 1980, p. 382).²⁴

However, Jackman's democracy measure was itself flawed in another common respect, including as one of four equally weighted components voter turnout rates (among adults of voting age). This same practice, which confuses the democraticness of the regime with the democratic behavior of its individual citizens, flaws the design of Coulter's (1975) study of the determinants of "liberal democracy," which is further (but less seriously) flawed by its use of Cutright's index as a measure of competitiveness. One should be cautious about interpreting the results from studies employing measures of such questionable validity unless those studies present (as Coulter's does in places) evidence for individual components of the democracy measure that are more valid than the scale as a whole.²⁵

A methodologically and conceptually much sounder measure of democracy is Bollen's scale of political democracy for 1960 and 1965.²⁶ Using this scale, Bollen and Jackman (1985) produced one of the clearest and most frequently cited quantitative studies of the determinants of democracy. It employed several different multiple regression models (ordinary and weighted least squares) to estimate the effects on political democracy in 1960 and 1965 of several independent variables that figure prominently in the literature on determinants of democracy: economic development (as measured by the log of per capita GNP), ethnic pluralism (as indicated by Taylor and Hudson's,

1972, widely used measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization), the percentage of the population that is Protestant, prior history as a British colony, and recent passage to nationhood (the latter two both dichotomous variables). Bollen and Jackman found that most of their noneconomic variables did have significant effects on democracy (negatively for cultural pluralism—though significantly so only for 1965—positively for Protestantism and British colonial heritage). However, economic development level explained more of the variance by itself than did a regression with all the other variables collectively. And they found that “a good portion (about 50%) of the effects of cultural pluralism and Protestantism are, in fact, effects of economic development” (p. 39). Reinforcing Jackman’s earlier finding, they found (by using the logarithmic functional form for the per capita GNP variable) that the effect of economic development is nonlinear, “such that the impact of development on democracy is most pronounced at lower levels of development and declines thereafter” (p. 39).

Previous studies by Bollen (1979, 1983) had found consistently strong positive effects on democracy of the level of economic development, no significant relationship between the timing of development and democracy, positive effects of Protestant culture, negative effects of state control over the economy, and negative effects of peripheral and semiperipheral (dependent) status in the world economy (even after controlling for economic development). Using a panel analysis that regressed several of these independent variables (in 1960) and political democracy in 1960 on democracy in 1965, Bollen (1979) was able to demonstrate the significance of socioeconomic development even in accounting for changes in levels of democracy between 1960 and 1965.

Two other innovative analyses published around the same time as Bollen’s also found significant positive effects on democracy of economic development level but with important caveats. Using panel regression analysis for two periods of time (1950 to 1965 and 1960 to 1975) on two measures of centralization of power (regimes with less than two genuine parties and military regimes), Thomas, Ramirez, Meyer, and Gobalet (1979) found “substantial and significant” negative effects of economic development (per capita GNP) on centralist regimes but also that these effects were reduced (for party centralization) in a sample of new nations only (p. 197). Further, because two measures of national economic dependence were independently associated (positively) with political centralism (i.e., authoritarianism) while other modernization variables like education and urbanization were not, they concluded (pp. 200-201) that world system theory had more validity than modernization theory (associated with Lipset).²⁷

Hannan and Carroll (1981), studying explicitly for the first time regime *change* (from 1950 to 1975) with the event history method, found that economic development (per capita GNP) inhibits movement from *all* political regime forms (one-party even more than multiparty) but also encourages transitions to the multiparty form. Like Thomas et al., they found "no evidence that modernizing experiences and institutions [e.g., education] affect rates of change in political forms" (p. 30), but they also found no effects of economic dependency on regime stability or change. The crucial finding of Hannan and Carroll was that high levels of economic development tended to promote the stability not only of democracy but of all types of regimes. However, that finding was based on the experience of the 1950-1975 period. Were the analysis to be reconducted today, after the pervasive breakdown of communist one-party states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the transitions in newly industrializing countries like South Korea and Taiwan, it would probably show a very different effect of economic development on one-party regimes in recent years.

The most recent and in some ways most comprehensive statistical analysis has been undertaken by Lipset himself in collaboration with two graduate student colleagues (Lipset, Seong, & Torres, 1991). Reexamining the Bollen and Jackman data for 1960 and 1965 and adding their own panel regression analysis for the 1970s and 1980s using the combined Freedom House scale of civil and political liberties, Lipset et al. (1991) continued to find "that economic development is the single most important predictor of political democracy when controlling for other variables" (p. 12). Testing nonlinear models on a sample of developing countries, they found a consistently good and significant fit for an N-curve relationship, such that economic development increases the chances for democracy up to a lower-middle level of per capita GNP, then decreases the odds in a middle range (between \$2,346 and \$5,000 in 1980), while stabilizing the chances for democracy at a very high probability in the higher-income range.

Multiple regression analyses that I conducted previously with Lipset, Seong, and others uncovered another significant and distinctive finding. In a number of different regressions, the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) had consistently positive effects on political freedom, usually highly significant statistically (and sometimes even more so than per capita GNP). For example, when the 1984 political freedom index was regressed on six different time-lagged indicators of socioeconomic development, the only two factors that emerged as significant were per capita GNP (lagged back in time quite substantially to 1965) and the PQLI in 1970. The latter effect was substantially larger and more significant statistically, while urbanization,

education, and communication showed no independent effect (possibly because of multicollinearity among the independent variables). In a similar regression for 72 developing countries only, the PQLI was again powerful and highly significant in its positive effect, while per capita GNP showed no independent effect at all. The substantial and statistically significant correlations in both samples (.67 and .42) between 1965 per capita GNP and 1970 PQLI suggested that the latter could be a critical intervening variable in the relationship between development and democracy.

In related regressions employing shorter (5- and 10-year time lags), this causal path was given considerable support. We tested 5 different models of the per capita income-PQLI-democracy relationship (three with successive 5-year time lags and two with successive 10-year time lags) each on two different samples of nations (one global, one less developed countries only). In each of these 10 regressions, the PQLI exhibited powerful positive effects on political freedom, significant at the .001 level. Also, per capita GNP had very powerful (and again always highly significant) positive effects on PQLI 5 or 10 years later. The direct effects of per capita GNP on democracy were always positive but weaker than those of PQLI and were statistically significant only about half the time. Economic dependence never showed direct significant effects, while military expenditures sometimes showed significant negative effects on democracy. Figure 1 presents the findings for one of the causal paths tested. In all, the evidence gave substantial support to the thesis that the contribution of economic development to democracy is substantially mediated through improvements in the physical quality of life.²⁸

WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE

Reviewing this accumulation of quantitative evidence over 3 decades of social science research, what are we able to conclude? The following generalizations appear warranted:

1. There is a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development (as indicated by both per capita income and measures of physical well-being).
2. This relationship is causal in at least one direction: Higher levels of socioeconomic development generate a significantly higher probability of democratic government.
3. It also appears to be the case that high levels of socioeconomic development are associated with not only the presence but the stability of democracy.²⁹
4. The relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy is not unilinear but in recent decades has more closely resembled an "N-curve"—increasing the chances for democracy among poor and perhaps lower-middle-




Figure 1: Causal Model of Determinants of Democracy

NOTE: Figures are the standardized regression coefficients for the paths indicated. $n = 88$; $r^2 = .62$.
 $*p < .001$.

income countries, neutralizing or even inverting to a negative effect at some middle range of development and industrialization, and then increasing again to the point where democracy becomes extremely likely above a certain high level of economic development (roughly represented by a per capita income of \$6,000 in current U.S. dollars).

5. The causal relationship between development and democracy may not be stable across time but may itself vary across periods or waves in world history. The current wave of global democratic expansion may be weakening or eroding Dahl's (1971) hypothesized "lower threshold" of per capita GNP below which the chances for democracy are "slight"—although democracy

would still be less likely at this income level than at any other above it. Even more so, the current wave may be moderating or eliminating the reverse relationship between democracy and development at middle levels of development.

6. The level of socioeconomic development is the most important variable in determining the chances of democracy, but it is far from completely determinative. Other variables exercise influence, and a number of countries (still) have regime forms that appear anomalous in terms of their level of development.
7. Although per capita national income appears to be the one independent variable that has most reliably and consistently predicted the level of democracy, this is likely a surrogate for a broader measure of average human development and well-being that is in fact even more closely associated with democracy. Lipset's thesis may thus be slightly reformulated: *The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country.*

It is important to emphasize here the extraordinary consistency with which the central premise of Lipset's thesis has stood up through all manner of tests. Although different studies and research designs yield different angles of inference and interpretation, they virtually all demonstrate a consistent and strong positive relationship between the level of economic development and democracy (or in one case, a negative relationship between economic development and authoritarian regimes). The effects of economic development are not only powerful and consistent but often literally overwhelming. In 44 regressions for various sets of nations (each including all countries for which data were available) over two different time periods and on two different types of authoritarian regimes, alternating into their regressions 11 different control variables, Thomas et al. (1979, Table 11B) found that economic development had a significant negative effect in 43 of the 44 equations. Of these 43 effects, 24 were significant beyond the .01 level, 16 were at the .05 level, and 3 were at the .10 level. In those 44 regressions, the 11 other independent variables showed significant effects only four times (less than 10% of the times they were tested).³⁰

As is indicated by the summary of their principal features in Table 3, this common finding of a strong positive relationship between economic development and democracy is virtually the only one that these various studies share in common. Given the considerable variation in quantitative methods, in countries and years tested, in the measures of democracy employed, and in the vast array of different regression equations (testing more than 20 different independent variables), this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative national development. Further, there are strong methodological and theoretical grounds for inferring that this relationship is indeed causal (without precluding the very real possibility of reciprocal causation). Several of the studies employ panel or

TABLE 3: Quantitative Studies of the Correlates and Determinants of Democracy

	<i>Curtwright (1963)</i>	<i>Olsen (1968)</i>	<i>Curtwright and Wiley (1969)</i>	<i>Jackman (1973)</i>	<i>Bollen (1979, 1983)</i>	<i>Bollen and Jackman (1985)</i>	<i>Thomas, Ramirez, Meyer, and Gobalet (1979)</i>	<i>Hannan and Carroll (1981)</i>	<i>Diamond et al. (1987)</i>	<i>Lipset, Seong, and Torres (1991)</i>
Method used	Correlation	Correlation	Cross-lagged correlations	Multiple regression	Multiple regression and panel regression	Multiple regression	Panel regression	Event history	Panel regression	Multiple regression
Years analyzed	1940-1960	1940-1960	1927-1936, 1937-1946, 1947-1956, and 1957-1966	1960	1960 and 1965	1960 and 1965	1950-1965 and 1960-1975	1950-1975	1965-1975, 1975-1985, and 1965-1985	1960, 1965, 1975, 1980, and 1985
Scope and number of cases	77 (every region but Africa)	115 (independent nations)	40 (independent from 1927 to 1966)	60 (non-communist)	28-99, 94-100 (+4 75% random samples)	97-109	Global (49-102) and new nations (15-37)	90 countries and 206 transitions	Global (80-100) and less developed countries (62-72)	66-104 former colonies
Democracy variable	Index of political representation (includes stability)	(1) Scale of "political modernization" and (2) Curtwright index	Curtwright index with a franchise index	Jackman index (democratic structures and participation and press freedom)	Bollen index (1960 and 1965)	Bollen index (1960 and 1965)	Categorical: state centralism (military and 1-party regimes)	Categorical regime index (4 types)	Freedom House scale of political freedom (62-72)	Bollen index (1960 and 1965) and Freedom House (1973-1985)

(continued)

dynamic designs, and as I will show, there is considerable evidence (especially historical) to support Lipset's arguments about the specific mechanisms by which economic development favors democracy.

In a survey of some of these same quantitative studies and the comparative historical critiques of the Lipset thesis, Rueschemeyer (1991) arrived at a similar conclusion:

There is a stable positive association between social and economic development and political democracy. This cannot be explained away by problems of operationalization. A whole array of different measures of development and democracy were used in the studies under review, and this did not substantially affect the results.

This result cannot be invalidated either by arguing that it may not apply to certain regions of the world. Nor can it be explained by diffusion from a single center of democratic creativity, though some associations of democracy with former British colonial status as well as the proportion of Protestants were found by Bollen (1979). It also cannot be explained by a particularly close correlation between development and democracy at the highest levels of development, because samples consisting only of less developed countries exhibited substantially the same patterns. Finally, the close concatenation of level of development and democracy cannot be accounted for by a special association between early modernization and democracy since the explicit inclusion of measures of the timing of development did not significantly affect the relationship between level of development and democracy. (pp. 25-26)

Rueschemeyer is nevertheless left unsatisfied, as are many readers, with the insights that these many studies generate, for although they show that there is clearly a positive relationship between development and democracy, and even enable us to infer causality, most of them tell us little about why development tends to generate democracy, how it does so, and under what circumstances it fails to do so, or does the reverse. While some of the more recent quantitative studies, especially those using panel regression, dynamic, and path-analytic methods, have begun to generate insights of this kind, we remain heavily dependent for the answers to these questions on the evidence from case study and comparative historical analysis.

HISTORICAL CASE AND COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE

I will not attempt here to present in any systematic fashion the many critiques of the Lipset thesis that have derived from (qualitative) historical and comparative analysis. However, it is useful to summarize a few of the principal challenges so as to examine *their* durability 15 years into the progress of the "third wave" of global democratization. I then examine each

of the causal mechanisms asserted by Lipset to undergird the democracy-development relationship.

CHALLENGES TO LIPSET

Probably the most forceful challenge to the Lipset hypothesis—and to the entire “modernization” school with which it was associated—came from the dependency school that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s and the affiliated perspective of world system theory. Much dependency thinking posited a negative relationship of economic dependency to democracy. These theorists argued that the dependent capitalist developing states were captured by elites in alliance with and serving the interests of dominant countries and corporations abroad. This exclusionary alliance required political repression of popular mobilization to maintain low wage levels and high profit levels (Evans, 1979; Fernandes, 1975). In an enormously influential analysis, O’Donnell (1973) argued that at a certain stage of economic development in contemporary Latin America, further development produced not democracy but “bureaucratic-authoritarian” dictatorship. This stage came roughly when the opportunities for “easy” import-substituting industrialization through production of light consumer goods became more or less exhausted and countries needed to “deepen” their industrialization to produce capital goods. This deepening necessitated reducing popular consumption to generate higher domestic investment and attract foreign investment. This in turn required demobilization (typically with brutal repression, at least initially) of militant trade union movements and populist parties and politicians. To pursue this strategy of dependent capitalist development, military coups brought to power coalitions of civilian and military technocrats, supported by large-scale domestic and international capital.

This perspective also had its proponents outside the radical dependency school. In explicit criticism of Lipset and other modernization theorists who argued, in effect, that “all good things go together,” Huntington and Nelson (1976) asserted that there were basic trade-offs at different stages of development between three key goals: growth, equity, and (democratic) participation. At low levels of industrialization, or what they called Phase I, equity and participation conflict. A key requirement for reducing inequality in these more agrarian societies—land reform—in turn requires (though it is not assured by) an authoritarian regime. If democracy is chosen, democratic participation will be dominated by rural and urban elites; their rule might produce economic growth but not greater equity. When countries begin to industrialize and develop strong trade unions and other popular sector movements (roughly akin to the approach of the capital goods era in the

O'Donnell thesis), a different conflict emerges, one between participation and economic growth. A participatory (democratic) regime in this phase would be dominated by populist parties and movements making so many demands for distribution that they would choke off economic growth. The choice in this phase is therefore between a "populist" democracy and a "technocratic" (read bureaucratic-authoritarian) dictatorship.

In urging a historical, "genetic" approach to the study of democracy, Rustow (1970) issued one of the earlier and more influential challenges to the Lipset thesis. Democracies, he suggested, had existed at low levels of economic development historically (e.g., the United States in 1820, France in 1870, and Sweden in 1890). The only true prerequisites for democracy, he argued, were a sense of national unity and some kind of elite commitment to a democratic transition, often arising not out of any intrinsic valuing of democracy but out of a stalemated conflict for which democracy seems to offer the best chance of resolution (p. 352).

As I will argue in conclusion, Rustow was right that no particular level of economic development is a *prerequisite* for democracy (it would be difficult, for that matter, to specify any level of national unity as an absolute *prerequisite* for democracy). But the analogy to 19th century low-income democracies is inappropriate for several reasons. In his own reassessment of his famous thesis, Lipset (1981, p. 475) observed,

These and other early democracies had . . . the historical advantage of having formed their political institutions prior to the emergence of a worldwide communications system which might make it apparent that other countries were much wealthier than they, and before the appearance of electorally significant popular movements that demanded more equal distribution of worldly goods. (p. 475)

Thus they had the advantage of gradual development. They did not have to meet simultaneous or overlapping crises of integration, legitimation, penetration, participation, and distribution that have confronted developing countries in the post-World War II era (Binder, 1971; Diamond, 1980; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). In particular, they benefited from a favorable historical sequence in which the institutions of competition developed first among a limited stratum of political participants and gradually incorporated a wider and wider range of citizens. Historically, this has been the path most likely to produce a "system of mutual security" and trust between contending elites, but in an age of instant communication and universal franchise it is no longer open to emerging democracies (Dahl, 1971). Thus new democracies emerge in less developed countries with increasingly high levels of social and

political mobilization, in which social and economic demands are liable easily to overwhelm the capacity of poor states to meet them and in which nascent participatory institutions may be ill equipped to incorporate and respond to historically marginalized groups (Huntington, 1968).

More to the point is Rustow's (1970) concern to take a genetic or historical approach. In doing so, we inevitably find that history is not moved by some hidden economic hand but by people and the variety of interests, values, and unique historical factors that motivate them. Yet changing social and economic conditions—including economic development and its consequences—powerfully frame those interests and values and conjunctures. Behind the contending elite values and interests, strategies and calculations, divisions and pacts that take the lead in elite-centered theories of democratic transition (Burton & Higley, 1987; Higley & Burton, 1989; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Rustow, 1970), one may frequently discern the facilitating effects of long periods of social and economic development.

SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A "CAUSE" OF DEMOCRACY

In his original essay, Lipset (1960) hypothesized a number of historical and sociological processes by which economic development generated a greater likelihood of democracy. First, economic development gives rise to a more democratic political culture, due in part to increased education. Citizens come to value democracy more and to manifest a more tolerant, moderate, restrained, and rational style with respect to politics and political opposition (pp. 39-40). This moderation of political conflict is also advanced by several interrelated changes in the class structure that accompany economic development. Higher levels of income and economic security at the mass level temper the intensity of the "class struggle, by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics" (p. 45). Among the upper strata as well, attitudes change; with rising national income, the upper classes are less likely to regard the lower classes as "vulgar, innately inferior" and hence utterly unworthy of political rights and the opportunity to share power (p. 51). More generally, Lipset argued that increased wealth reduces the overall level of objective inequality, weakening status distinctions, and, most important, increasing the size of the middle class (pp. 47-51). Economic development also tempers the tendency of the lower classes to political extremism by exposing them to cross-pressures in a more complex society (p. 50). Finally, with respect to class, Lipset suggested that economic development would reduce the pre-

mium on political power by reducing the costs of socioeconomic redistribution and by generating attractive income and career alternatives to positions in the state (pp. 51-52). Independent of these changes in class structure, Lipset maintained, in a Tocquevillean vein, that economic development would also contribute to democracy by giving rise to a large number of voluntary, intermediary organizations that collectively increase political participation, enhance political skills, generate and diffuse new opinions, and inhibit the state or other domineering forces from monopolizing political resources.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider systematically the historical and comparative evidence for each of these processes. Hence what follows is a more illustrative sketch of the very substantial and compelling accumulation of empirical data since Lipset first articulated these arguments.

Political Culture

Lipset (1960) cited a number of studies suggesting a strong relationship between education, socioeconomic status, and modernization, on one hand, and democratic values and tendencies, on the other. Subsequent survey evidence has added further support to Lipset's argument that educated individuals tend to be more tolerant of opposition and of minorities, and more committed to democracy and participation. In their study of five national political cultures, Almond and Verba (1963) found that educational attainment had "the most important demographic effect on political attitudes." Within each of the five nations, more educated people were found to be better informed politically and more broadly opinionated, more likely to follow politics, and more likely to engage in political discussion and to join and become active in an organization (with obvious implications for the development of civil society), more confident of their capacity to influence government, and more likely to manifest trust in other people. Inkeles (1969) found in his six-country comparative study of modernization that education in particular, and mass media exposure as well, contributed significantly to a syndrome of "active citizenship," with attitudinal, informational, and behavioral consequences similar to those found by Almond and Verba (1963).

Of course, as Almond and Verba conceded, the fact that educated people are much more inclined to participate tells us nothing in itself about the content of that participation, and Huntington (1968) warned that such social mobilization, in the absence of adequate political institutionalization, can actually lead to political instability and praetorianism. However, Inkeles's syndrome of individual modernity, of which active citizenship is one dimension, also includes such other democratic orientations as efficacy, respect for

minority rights, and “freedom from absolute submission to received authority” (Inkeles & Smith, 1974, p. 109), and this larger syndrome is also advanced by education and contact with other modernizing institutions, like the factory and mass media. Inkeles (1978) subsequently established that the level of economic development of the nation has a substantial independent effect on individual modernity. More to the point for Lipset’s thesis, Inkeles and Diamond (1980) showed that this effect of the national context held quite strongly for a number of discrete elements of democratic political culture, even when socioeconomic status was to some extent controlled. Surveying a large number of comparative studies, they computed, in each case, a rank order correlation between the average scores of country samples (within socioeconomic or occupational groups) on certain types of attitudes and values and the per capita GNPs of their countries. The median rank order correlations were .76 for measures of antiauthoritarianism (or tolerance), .85 for trust, .55 for efficacy, and .60 for personal satisfaction (which has strong potential implications for political legitimacy). Recently, Inglehart (1990) has shown (with comparative survey data from more than 20 mainly European countries) that life satisfaction and interpersonal trust are highly correlated not only with economic development but with stable democracy.³¹

A very different type of quantitative evidence derives from Powell’s (1982) comparative study of 29 countries that had democratic regimes for at least 5 years during the period 1958-1976. Grouping his sample into four levels of modernization in 1965, he found a modest association between participation (voting turnout) and development level, increasing sharply from the lowest development groups to the second highest but leveling off after that. His truly stunning behavioral evidence, however, concerned political violence: The median annual death rate from political violence was dramatically higher among the six least developed countries—India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey, Costa Rica, and Jamaica—than among any of the other groups.³² Not coincidentally, these six countries together experienced the greatest democratic instability of any of the four development levels, and in every case (except stable Costa Rica) political violence played a major role. In that deadly political violence is an obvious—indeed, the *ultimate*—behavioral manifestation of intolerance and lack of moderation, it is certainly consistent with Lipset’s theory that it was the poorest nations that experienced the greatest amount of it. Powell stated that “insofar as containment of violence is a measure of democratic performance, the poorer nations seem to be much more difficult to govern as democracies” (p. 41).³³

There is also (less precise) historical evidence that attitudes and values may change in response to socioeconomic development. Booth and Seligson (1992) were “startled to discover” that despite the long experience of author-

itarian rule in Mexico and the general assumptions about the authoritarian character of Mexican political culture, their sample of urban, working- and middle-class Mexicans “manifested high levels of support” for civil liberties and extensive rights of participation and dissent. These democratic inclinations were broadly distributed, despite their also being modestly correlated with education and class standing. Booth and Seligson speculated that a number of factors—diffusion from the United States, long experience with the rhetoric and forms of constitutionalism, and disillusionment with the ruling party—may account for this. However, an equally if not more compelling explanation would look to the cultural impact of a quarter-century of relatively rapid growth in per capita GNP, averaging 3.0% annually between 1965 and 1989, and probably affecting the urban working and middle classes most intensively.³⁴

Elsewhere in Latin America, case studies discern evidence of socioeconomic development producing democratic value change, at least among important class groups. Just as highly undemocratic attitudes and values in Peru and the Dominican Republic were fostered by poverty and inequality, rapid socioeconomic change in these two countries helped to breed, among new business and professional elites and other educated middle-class groups, a stronger value on democratic participation and a more acute appreciation of the need for social and political accommodation (Diamond & Linz, 1989; McClintock, 1989; Wiarda, 1989). As a result of the socioeconomic reforms under the Velasco military regime in Peru (1968-1975), which reduced inequality and oligarchical power, and also as a result of dramatically increased access to television and secondary and university education, lower- and middle-class groups in Peru became more politically active, informed, and sophisticated and manifested, in a number of surveys during the 1980s, historically high levels of democratic attitudes (McClintock, 1989).

Class Structure and International Diffusion

The Peruvian case also indicates that the effects of socioeconomic development on political culture are heavily mediated through changes in the class structure. In fact, these changes—the growth of the middle class and more specifically of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the enlargement, unionization, and improved incomes of the working class, and the migration of the rural poor to cities and consequent disruption of clientelistic and feudalistic relations in the countryside—are heavily interrelated in time and logic. Their interactive effect in stimulating democratization in Taiwan has been succinctly depicted by Cheng (1989):

Rapid growth . . . had liberalizing consequences that the KMT had not fully anticipated. With the economy taking off, Taiwan displayed the features common to all growing capitalist societies: The literacy rate increased; mass communication intensified; per capita income rose; and a differentiated urban sector—including labor, a professional middle class, and a business entrepreneurial class—came into being. The business class was remarkable for its independence. Although individual enterprises were small and unorganized, they were beyond the capture of the party-state. To prevent the formation of big capital, the KMT had avoided organizing business or picking out “national champions.” As a result, small and medium enterprises dominated industrial production and exports. As major employers and foreign exchange earners, these small and medium businesses were quite independent of the KMT. (p. 481)

Cheng also found that democratization in Taiwan was particularly advanced by “the newly emerging middle-class intellectuals who had come of age during the period of rapid economic growth,” who were connected through family and social ties to the emergent bourgeoisie, and whose training abroad in law and the social sciences heavily disposed them to “Western democratic ideals” (p. 483).

Taiwan is unique in many senses, and theoretically it stands out here for having achieved rapid economic growth while at the same time significantly improving the distribution of income and thus accelerating the democratic impact of development by diffusing it more rapidly to the lower strata. Typically, income inequality is aggravated during the early phase of industrialization. However, where this effect does not become too severe and where the material conditions of all class groups improve at least in absolute terms, economic development is eventually likely to have political consequences similar to those that Cheng identified for Taiwan. Even at a much lower stage of economic development, brisk economic growth (averaging 6.4% annually in GDP during the 1980s) generated pressure for democratization in Pakistan. Particularly important were the emergence (as in northern India) of rural and small-town entrepreneurs, the general improvement of the rural economy, the diminishing power of the traditional rural landed elite, rapid urbanization, and a better organized and more active trade union movement. Moreover, development may be expected to deepen and invigorate democracy over time in Pakistan by propelling into politics a new, better educated generation from rural elite families, thus broadening the base of political parties long dominated by urban elite families, most of whom fled from India at the time of partition (Rose, 1988).

Of course, whatever impact economic development has on democracy will be more decisive to the extent that it thrusts a country into higher *levels* of development, and to the extent that it occurs rapidly, because “rapid economic growth creates rapidly the economic base for democracy” and may

also generate “stresses and strains” that wear thin the fabric of authoritarian rule (Huntington, 1991, p. 69). This was a critical underlying factor, Huntington (1991) argued, in the democratic transitions in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the mid-1970s, whose (per capita) economic growth rates in the quarter century before their transitions averaged 5% to 6% annually (p. 68). Such vigorous and sustained development rapidly expanded the middle classes while at the same time raising expectations, heightening inequality in some cases (especially Brazil), and generating frustration, discontent, and political mobilization (for democracy).

As Huntington recognized in an important if subtle qualification of Lipset’s thesis, the burgeoning middle classes are not *always* prodemocratic and may even actively support authoritarian rule under conditions of social polarization and threat like those prevailing in Brazil and the Southern Cone of South America during the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, one irony of the combination of effective authoritarian rule and rapid economic development is that it eliminates (albeit often at tragic human cost) these conditions of class polarization and insurgency, rendering the authoritarian regime “dispensable,” in the language of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 27). Thus what has been considered for some years now a critical factor in elite-centered theories of democratic transition (very much opposed in spirit to Lipset’s structural approach)—change in the strategic interests and behavior of crucial middle-class groups—often springs from the very structural factor emphasized by Lipset: economic development.

These changes in both the alignment of the bourgeoisie and the culture and structure of society more generally have had a powerful impact in motivating democratic transition in South Korea. Rapid economic growth—averaging 7% annually in per capita GNP since 1965—had democratizing consequences similar to those in Taiwan, even though industrialization proceeded with greater concentration of capital and repression of labor. Indeed, in both countries, an important incentive for democratization was not only the increasing contact of urban middle classes with Western democratic values but the realization—quite powerful for a country where industrialization is so heavily led by exports—that “democratization is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced nations” (Han, 1989, p. 294).

These indirect effects of economic development in “internationalizing” a country’s elite and its values have probably always been present, but they are more intensive today than ever before. In an era of satellite communications, jet travel, and increasing global interdependence, “economic development in the 1960s and 1970s both required and promoted the opening of societies to foreign trade, investment, technology, tourism, and communications. . . . Autarchy and development were an impossible combination” (Huntington,

1991, p. 66). Further contributing to this internationalizing impact of development has been the increasing salience of formal and informal supranational structures, like the European Community, that regard democracy (*explicitly* in the case of the European Community) as a prerequisite for membership (Diamond, 1992b; Huntington, 1991). This growing interconnectedness adds an additional dimension to the impact of socioeconomic development. So does the rapid improvement in the technology of communication, transportation, and information storage and retrieval, which has had two very strong prodemocratic effects: radically decentralizing and pluralizing flows of information, and producing more powerful, immediate, and pervasive diffusion effects than ever before, reaching well beyond the elite sector. Where the dominant themes and images conveyed are democratic, as they have been in world culture for more than a decade, so will be the political consequences.

State and Society.

Lipset argued that economic development alters the relationship between state and society to favor the emergence and maintenance of democracy. One way it does so, he suggested, is by reducing nepotism and bureaucratic corruption, and more generally, by altering the zero-sum nature of the electoral struggle. Reformulating Lipset slightly, a major reason why democracy is less viable in less developed societies is because the "proportion . . . of wealth that the government or local elective bodies absorb and distribute is greater, and [therefore it becomes] harder . . . to secure an independent position and an honest living without relying in some respect or other upon public administration" (Mosca, 1896/1939, p. 143). While it may not be literally true that the state absorbs and distributes more wealth in less developed countries than in industrialized ones, it is certainly the case that at low levels of development, swollen states control a vastly greater share of the most valued economic opportunities (jobs, contracts, licenses, scholarships, and development largesse) than they do at higher levels of development. As Mosca (1896/1939) presciently foresaw, this is yet another reason why democracy requires "a large [middle] class of people whose economic position is virtually independent of those who hold supreme power" (p. 144).

In the post-World War II era, the pressures and prevailing models in the world system and the insecurities of peripheral status in that system, have induced underdeveloped new nations to build centralized, resource-intensive states (Meyer, 1980). As a result of this state expansion in the quest for rapid development, control of the state itself has become the principal means of personal accumulation and hence the principal determinant of class formation (Diamond, 1987; Sklar, 1979). Both through legitimate state employ-

ment and contracting and through all manner of illegitimate diversion of public funds, manipulation of state resources became the easiest, most common, and least risky means for accumulating personal wealth. Throughout Africa and in much of Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, this process gave rise to what Sklar (1965) termed, following Mosca, a "political class," in the sense that "political power is the primary force that creates economic opportunity and determines the pattern of social stratification" (pp. 203-204).

This distorted relationship between state and society has been one of the most fundamental causes of democratic breakdown in Africa and Asia following decolonization because it has generated many of the other factors superficially identified with democratic malfunctioning. It entrenched political corruption as the chief instrument of upward class mobility, draining democratic states of economic resources and political legitimacy. Both through the perverting effects of systematic rent seeking and through the pervasive impediments to productive enterprise generated by gross excesses in state ownership, regulation, taxation, and staffing, statism depressed and obstructed economic growth. By crowding out economic competition from the private sector, it prevented the emergence of an autonomous, productive (rather than parasitic) bourgeoisie. By subjecting virtually all developmental activity to state mediation and control, it made community as well as individual advancement dependent on control of the state, heightening inequality and political tension between ethnic and regional groups. Because of the latter inducement to group conflict, and because of the enormous premium for individuals on control of the state, it induced pervasive fraud and violence in the electoral struggle for power. Indeed, Powell's (1982) finding that deadly political violence is strongly negatively associated with economic development tells us a good deal more about the effects of statism in this context than about intrinsic features of the political cultures, as I have argued elsewhere for the case of Nigeria (Diamond, 1988a, 1988c).

Collectively, these consequences of statism—corruption, abuse of power, economic stagnation and crisis, ethnic conflict, electoral fraud, and political violence—heavily explain the failures of democracy thrice in Ghana, twice in Nigeria and Uganda, and more generally throughout the African continent (Chazan, 1988; Diamond, 1988b; Kokole and Mazrui, 1988). Outside of Africa as well, these perverse consequences of statism have contributed to the three breakdowns or interruptions of democracy in Turkey (Ozbudun, 1989), the ethnic polarization and consequent democratic deterioration in Sri Lanka (Phadnis, 1989), and the broad decline in democratic performance (including rising levels of corruption, party decay, group conflict and political violence) in India (Brass, 1990; Kohli, 1990). Certainly, swollen states

conducive to rent seeking are not inevitably a consequence of low levels of economic development; Singapore and Taiwan have developed rapidly while managing largely to avoid this syndrome, and Botswana has even done so within a democratic framework. Nor is statism absent at higher levels of development. However, statism is uniquely toxic to democracy at low levels of development precisely because it places such a high premium on control of the state. As Lipset (1960) argued, "If loss of office means serious losses for major power groups, they will seek to retain or secure office by any means available" (p. 51).

Civil Society

There is abundant historical evidence to support the hypothesized linkage between a vigorous associational life and a stable democracy. One could begin, of course, by citing Tocqueville's (1840/1945) seminal study of *Democracy in America*, as Lipset did. Tocqueville was perhaps the first to note the symbiotic, mutually reinforcing relationship between participation in civil society and participation in political life, depicting associations as "large free schools" where political interests were stimulated and political and organizational skills enhanced (p. 124). This effect has been particularly apparent in less developed countries like India and Costa Rica, where both organizational activity and partisan political participation have been more vigorous than would be expected from their levels of development (Booth, 1989; Das Gupta, 1989). Increasingly, civic organizations in the developing world are devoted to the political mobilization and empowerment of groups, such as women, young people, and the poor, traditionally excluded from power (Diamond, 1992a).

Second, as Lipset and other pluralists have argued, a vibrant associational life—and more generally, a robust and pluralistic civil society³⁵—checks and balances the power of the state. Related to this, a vibrant associational life makes for a pluralistic competition of interests, and provides poor and disadvantaged groups the capacity to relieve or redress the injustices they face. With the deterioration in the party system and the quality of political leadership, India's vigorous civil society has become an increasingly crucial (if turbulent) instrument of democratic accountability, interest articulation, social reform, and political renewal (Shah, 1988).

Third, a strong civil society may provide an indispensable bulwark against the consolidation of authoritarian rule and a catalyst for its demise. The "resurgence" of civil society has been a crucial factor in transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). The mobilization of independent media and organizations

has been similarly significant in pressuring for democratic change in the Philippines (Bautista, 1992; Pascual, 1992), Nigeria (Ekpu, 1992; Nwankwo, 1992), and South Africa (Heard, 1992; Schlemmer, 1991; Slabbert, 1991). Democratic change in Taiwan during the 1980s has been stimulated and advanced by a host of social movements—of consumers, workers, women, aborigines, farmers, students, teachers, and the environmentally concerned—breaking free of traditional deference or state intimidation and control to seek both specific demands and long-range goals (Gold, 1990). In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, the growth of autonomous organizational, cultural, and intellectual life has been a crucial factor in undermining the cultural hegemony and monopoly of information, then the political legitimacy, and ultimately the viability of the communist party-state (Lapidus, 1989; Nathan, 1990; Sadowski, in press; Starr, 1988; Weigle & Butterfield, 1991). Most recently in Africa, protests mobilized by autonomously organized urban groups—students, churches, trade unions, civil servants, lawyers, and other professionals—have focused sweeping discontent on demands for regime change, making “a direct connection between chronic economic and political malaise and the absence of democracy” (Chazan, 1991, p. 52; see also Joseph, 1991; Kuria, 1991).

One can imagine other positive consequences for democracy of a vigorous and pluralistic associational life. To the extent that they are democratic in their internal procedures of governance, voluntary associations may socialize their members into democratic values and beliefs and help to recruit and train new political leaders for the arena of formal democratic politics. More focused research is necessary to determine whether associations do (as a by-product of their other pursuits) perform these roles, but the emergence of civic organizations focused explicitly on these goals is significant (Barros, 1992; Martini, 1992; Pascual, 1992).

Although voluntary associations and other elements of civil society do not *inevitably* contribute to democracy and may even oppose it (depending on their purposes and ideologies), it is clear, on balance, that the increasing size, pluralism, and resourcefulness of civil societies around the world has been a major factor in the growth of democracy in recent decades. Numerous factors may affect the number, character, and strength of autonomous organizations in society, but it is also clear that *one* factor—socioeconomic development—contributes substantially to their growth. From Taiwan to China, from the Soviet Union to South Africa, and from Brazil to Thailand, economic development has had some strikingly similar effects: physically concentrating people into more populous areas of residence while at the same time dispersing them into wider, more diverse networks of interaction; decentralizing control over information and increasing alternative sources of informa-

tion; dispersing literacy, knowledge, income, and other organizational resources across wider segments of the population; and increasing functional specialization and interdependence and so the potential for functionally specific protests (e.g., transit strikes) to disrupt the entire system. These effects would figure to be, and probably are, more rapidly experienced within the context of a market economy, but they have registered intensely in communist systems as well with the expansion of education, industry, and mass communications.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This review of the evidence more than 3 decades later has demonstrated that Lipset (1960) was broadly correct both in his assertion of a strong causal relationship between economic development and democracy and in his explanations of *why* development promotes democracy. Needless to say, this relationship is not entirely predictive, nor is it necessarily linear. But that does not negate the validity of the overall relationship that Lipset hypothesized.

The preceding discussion suggests five conclusions and some obvious policy implications. First, socioeconomic development promotes democracy in two senses. Where democracy already exists, sustained development contributes significantly to its legitimacy and stability, especially in the early life of the regime (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1990, 1992, chap. 5). Where democracy does not exist, it leads (sooner or later) to the eventually (if not initially) *successful* establishment of democracy. However, it is difficult to predict at what point in a country's socioeconomic or historical development the democratic moment will emerge. Below Dahl's (1971) higher threshold of development, many factors continue to intervene to structure the probability of a democratic regime, and these are, as Huntington has suggested, heavily a matter of political institutions and political leadership and choice. Nor should we dismiss the importance of such "political crafting" for the successful democratization of countries near or above the threshold (Linz & Stepan, 1989).

Second, the finding of Hannan and Carroll (1981) for the 1950-1975 period notwithstanding, socioeconomic development does not produce the same enduringly legitimating effects for authoritarian regimes that it does for democratic ones. Rather, it presents the former with an inescapable dilemma. If authoritarian regimes "do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. However, . . . if they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they

cannot satisfy without terminating their existence" (Diamond, 1989, p. 150; also Huntington, 1991, p. 55). The latter pattern of change was crucial to the transitions in Spain, Taiwan, and South Korea, is very far along in Thailand, and is beginning to register in Indonesia.

Third, it is not economic development per se and certainly not mere economic growth that is the most important developmental factor in promoting democracy. Rather, it is the dense cluster of social changes and improvements, broadly distributed among the population, that are vaguely summarized in the term "*socioeconomic development*." Most important here are improvements in the physical quality and dignity of people's lives: access to potable water, safe and sanitary neighborhoods, and basic health care; literacy and advanced (probably at least some secondary) education; sufficient income to provide at least minimally adequate food and clothing and shelter for one's family; and sufficient skills to obtain a job that provides that income. Of course, the standards for what constitutes the decent and "minimally adequate" change over time and across cultures. But these basic material dimensions of "human development," as summarized in the UNDP (1991) index, better predict the presence and degree of democracy than does the level of per capita national wealth. Economic development provides a structural context in which human development can occur, but to the extent that its benefits are grossly maldistributed (or that its correlates, like urbanization, only alter the form and scale of human squalor), it may do little to promote democracy or may even generate stresses and contradictions that are hostile to democracy. For the democratic prospect, one aspect of economic development overrides all others in importance: reducing the level of absolute poverty and human deprivation.

There are several reasons why democracy is so closely related to the physical quality of life. First, these conditions generate the circumstances and skills that permit effective and autonomous participation. Second, when most of the population is literate, decently fed and sheltered, and otherwise assured of minimal material needs, class tensions and radical political orientations tend to diminish. Thus, as Lipset (1960) observed, "a belief in secular reformist gradualism can be the ideology of only a relatively well-to-do lower class" (p. 45).

Third, human beings appear to frame their values at least partly in response to what the psychologist Abraham Maslow (1954) termed a "hierarchy of needs." Recent comparative research indicates that physiological needs, for physical security and material sustenance, do take precedence over "higher order" needs of a more social, intellectual, and aesthetic nature (even though such research gives no support to Maslow's assumption of a predict-

able, pan-human hierarchy beyond the physiological needs; Inglehart, 1990, p. 152). Thus while the satisfaction of lower-order needs does not automatically increase the salience of individual needs for political freedom and influence, it makes the valuing of those needs more likely.

Fourth, economic development produces or facilitates democracy *only* insofar as it alters favorably four crucial intervening variables: political culture, class structure, state-society relations, and civil society. This is also the finding of perhaps the only cross-national quantitative analysis to combine indicators of both national development and individual attitudes, namely, Inglehart (1990, p. 44). In addition to change in the occupational structure, it identifies a powerful cultural factor mediating the relationship between economic development and stable democracy—a “civic culture” syndrome consisting of interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and political moderation.

Finally, it is important to emphasize as well that democracy can occur at low levels of development if the crucial mediating variables are present. Economic development is not a *prerequisite* for democracy. In fact, Lipset wrote of it as a “requisite,” meaning literally something that is essential but does not necessarily have to exist in advance. In a much neglected passage of his famous essay, he anticipated a crucial element of democratic experience in the contemporary developing world: “a premature democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private organizations” (p. 29).

Those developing countries that have maintained democracy for long periods of time have done just that. They have inherited or developed political cultures that emphasize tolerance, inclusion, participation, and accommodation, as has been the case (more or less) with India, Costa Rica, Botswana, Venezuela after 1958, and Chile and Uruguay before their polarization in the late 1960s and again in very recent years. Many of them have, as noted earlier with regard to India and Costa Rica, developed vibrant civil societies. And perhaps most of all, they have performed reasonably well in delivering human development. The 10 developing countries (above 1 million population) that have maintained more or less continuous democracy since 1965 reduced their infant mortality by a median annual rate of 3.25% from that year until the late 1980s, compared with a median annual reduction rate of 2.3% among 10 of the most prominent continuous dictatorships in that period. These democracies have survived in large part because they have substantially improved the quality of life for their citizens (Diamond et al., 1992, chap. 5).³⁶

This suggests that democracy is not incompatible with development and that in fact the causal trend *can* be reversed, with democracy leading to development. Although cross-national studies of the effects of democracy on economic development are inconclusive (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990), there remain strong theoretical grounds for expecting that political participation, liberty, accountability, and pluralism "would be conducive to economic achievements by industrious persons, particularly entrepreneurs," and to improvements in basic human needs as well (Sklar, 1987, pp. 709, 711). Indeed, with the spectacular failures of development in Africa over the past quarter century, many Africans now believe that democracy is essential for development (Ake, 1991). To formalize slightly Lipset's argument about "premature" democracies, poor countries can maintain democracy but only if they deliver broad and sustained (not necessarily rapid) socioeconomic development, especially "human development."

The policy implications of this are rather obvious. First, giving priority to basic human needs is not only sensible from the standpoint of economic development policy and intrinsically more humane, it is also more likely to promote or sustain democracy than more capital-intensive strategies that view basic health and literacy needs as "consumption" that must be deferred.

Second, in no country should democracy absolutely be ruled out as a possibility. Certainly, in very poor countries it is less likely, especially in its complete institutional configuration, but since "democracy comes to every country in fragments or parts" (Sklar, 1987, p. 714), development policy should try to encourage the institutionalization of as many parts or features of democracy as possible as early as possible. A careful reading of Lipset's thesis reveals that economic development promotes democracy only by effecting changes in political culture and social structure. Even at modest levels of economic development, countries can achieve significantly democratic cultures and civil societies and significant reductions in absolute poverty. If social and political actors, private and public, focus on these intermediate goals, they stand a good chance of developing democracy "prematurely."

Appendix: Ranking of Countries, by Freedom Status and Human Development Index in 1990

<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>High (Top 20) .993-.951</i>	<i>Medium- High (21-53) .950-.800</i>	<i>Medium (54-97) .796-.510</i>	<i>Medium- Low (98-128) .499-.253</i>	<i>Low (129-160) .242-.048</i>
State hegemonic, closed (13-14)		Kuwait ⁴⁸ Albania ⁴⁹	Cuba ⁶² China ⁸² North Korea ⁷⁴ Iraq ⁹¹ Libya ⁷⁶ Saudi Arabia ⁶⁹ Syria ⁷²	Myanmar ¹⁰⁶ Vietnam ⁹⁹	Afghanistan ¹⁵⁷ Angola ¹⁴⁷ Burundi ¹³⁹ Cambodia ¹⁴⁰ Chad ¹⁵² Ethiopia ¹⁴¹ Liberia ¹³² Malawi ¹³⁸ Mauritania ¹⁴⁸ Somalia ¹⁴⁹ Sudan ¹⁴³
State hegemonic, partially open (11-12)		Qatar ⁵⁰ Brunei ⁴² Bahrain ⁵¹	Iran ⁹² Lebanon ⁸⁸ Oman ⁸⁶ Romania ⁵⁸ United Arab Emirates ⁵⁶ Maldives ⁹³	Ghana ¹²¹ Kenya ¹¹³ Tanzania ¹²⁷ Zambia ¹¹⁸ Lesotho ¹⁰⁷ Indonesia ⁹⁸ Swaziland ¹⁰⁴	Mali ¹⁵⁶ Togo ¹³¹ Mozambique ¹⁴⁶ Guinea-Bissau ¹⁵¹ Guinea ¹⁵⁸ Niger ¹⁵⁵ Burkina Faso ¹⁵⁴ Central African Republic ¹⁴² Djibouti ¹⁵³ Bhutan ¹⁴⁴ Sierra Leone ¹⁶⁰ Uganda ¹³⁴ Yemen ¹³⁰
Noncompetitive, partially pluralist (10)			Jordan ⁸³ Fiji ⁷¹ Surinam ⁵⁵	Zimbabwe ¹¹¹ Cape Verde ¹⁰⁹ Comoros ¹²⁶ Ivory Coast ¹²² Sao Tome/ Principe ¹¹²	Bangladesh ¹³⁶ Nigeria ¹²⁹ Benin ¹⁵⁰
Semicompetitive, partially pluralist (7-9)		Malaysia ⁵² Mexico ⁴⁵ Yugoslavia ³⁴ Bulgaria ³³ USSR ³¹	Sri Lanka ⁷⁵ Tunisia ⁹⁰ Mongolia ⁸⁷ Colombia ⁶¹ Peru ⁷⁸	Egypt ¹¹⁴ Morocco ¹⁰⁸ Guatemala ¹⁰³ Pakistan ¹²⁰ Algeria ¹⁰²	Nepal ¹⁴⁵ Senegal ¹³⁵ Haiti ¹²⁵

(continued)

Appendix: Continued

<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>High (Top 20) .993-.951</i>	<i>Medium- High (21-53) .950-.800</i>	<i>Medium (54-97) .796-.510</i>	<i>Medium- Low (98-128) .499-.253</i>	<i>Low (129-160) .242-.048</i>
		Singapore ³⁷	South Africa ⁵⁷ Guyana ⁸⁹ El Salvador ⁹⁴ Paraguay ⁷³ Gabon ⁹⁷	Madagascar ¹¹⁶	
Competitive, partially illiberal (5-6)		South Korea ³⁵ Antigua/ Barbados ⁴⁶ Bahamas ²⁸	Philippines ⁸⁴ Thailand ⁶⁶ Turkey ⁷⁰ Nicaragua ⁸⁵ Panama ⁵⁴ Brazil ⁶⁰ Dominican Republic ⁸⁰	Bolivia ¹¹⁰ Honduras ¹⁰⁰ India ¹²³ Namibia ¹⁰⁵ Papua New Guinea ¹¹⁷ Vanuatu ¹⁰¹	
Competitive, pluralist, partially institutionalized (3-4)	France ¹⁰ Germany ¹⁴ United Kingdom ¹¹	Chile ³⁸ Cyprus ²⁶ Mauritius ⁴⁷ Argentina ⁴³ Israel ²¹ Uruguay ³² Venezuela ⁴⁴ Czechoslo- vakia ²⁷ Hungary ³⁰ Poland ⁴¹ Dominica ⁵³ Portugal ³⁶ Greece ²⁴	Grenada ⁶⁴ West Samoa ⁸¹ Botswana ⁹⁵ Ecuador ⁷⁷ Jamaica ⁵⁹ St. Lucia ⁶⁸ St. Vincent ⁷⁹ Belize ⁶⁷	Gambia ¹⁵⁹	
Liberal democracy (2)	Australia ⁹ Canada ² Italy ¹⁸ Japan ¹ Spain ²⁰ Sweden ⁴ USA ⁷ Austria ¹⁷ Belgium ¹⁶ Denmark ¹² Finland ¹³	Costa Rica ⁴⁰ Trinidad/ Tobago ³⁹ Ireland ²³ Barbados ²² Malta ²⁹	St. Christopher- Nevis ⁶⁵ Solomon Islands ⁹⁶		

Appendix: Continued

Regime Type	High	Medium-	Medium	Medium-	Low
	(Top 20)	High (21-53)	Medium (54-97)	Low (98-128)	Low (129-160)
	.993-.951	.950-.800	.796-.510	.499-.253	.242-.048
	Iceland ³				
	Luxembourg ¹⁹				
	Netherlands ¹⁸				
	New Zealand ¹⁵				
	Norway ⁶				
	Switzerland ⁵				

SOURCE: United Nations Development Program (1991, Table 1).

NOTE: Superscript numbers represent the rank of the country on the Human Development Index, with 1 being highest.

NOTES

1. All page references are to the version of the essay in *Political Man*, published originally in 1960, as Chapter 2, "Economic Development and Democracy," and specifically to the 1963 Anchor Books edition, which are the same page numbers as the 1981 expanded edition.

2. The 10 European stable democracies in 1960 were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, USSR, and Yugoslavia.

3. He would also have avoided the methodological problem, emphasized by Bollen (1980, 1990) of confounding two distinct phenomena, democracy and stability, in a single measure.

4. These figures (rounded to whole numbers) were computed for this essay by Yongchuan Liu. Data on per capita GNP in 1960 was missing for four Communist East European dictatorships, but the mean difference between the two groups is too substantial to be suspect because of this.

5. On literacy, the stepwise increase in mean levels is from 87.1% for dictatorships to 94.8% for unstable democracies to 98.5% for stable democracies. Mean per capita GNP levels progress from \$598 to \$1,026 to \$1,479. PQLI scores proceed from 89.2 to 92.8 to 98.6. A similar stepwise increase is apparent on the PQLI among the three Latin American country groups: "stable dictatorships," "unstable democracies," and "democracies." However, as there are only two countries in the middle category (Colombia and Mexico, both semidemocracies), that *n* is too small to permit reliable comparison.

6. In fact, as Cutright (1963) observed, "the spread in the values on almost every indicator [of socioeconomic development] is so extreme that it appears that it would be very difficult to place a single nation in either the democratic or non-democratic category knowing, for example, only its score on the number of telephones" (p. 254).

7. Huntington includes in this count some states, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Romania, that are better labeled semidemocratic. By a more cautious calculation, sensitive to the distinction between semidemocracy and democracy, I estimate the number of democracies in 1990 at 44 in states over 1 million and 65 total (Diamond, 1992b).

8. Authoritarian Latin American countries had higher rates of unionization than did semicompetitive regimes in that region, but this may have been due to state corporatist control of such unions.

9. I define democracy here in terms of these three dimensions, as articulated by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990, pp. 6-7), drawing from Dahl (1971).

10. The two ratings (which actually summarize a more detailed "raw point score" of from 0 to 44) are then aggregated into three broad categories: *free*, *partly free*, and *not free*. These categories do not entirely overlap with other groupings of countries into, for example, democracies, semidemocracies, and authoritarian/totalitarian regimes. While "free" states roughly correspond to the generally accepted standards for polyarchy or democracy among social scientists, the "partially free" states include many that cannot be considered even semidemocratic. See also Gastil (1990).

11. One of the most striking correlates of democracy in the contemporary world (when most of the remaining European colonies have become independent) is the much greater incidence of democracy among "ministates" of less than 1 million population. Such states were much more likely to be democratic in 1990 (57%) than were states with more than 1 million population (34%; Diamond, 1991).

12. The PQLI is an unweighted index of three measures: adult literacy, infant mortality (i.e., death rates before the age of 1 year), and life expectancy at age 1 year. Each measure is standardized on a scale of from 0 to 100 (Morris, 1979).

13. The measure is thus similar to the HDI. For each of the HDI's three components, maximum and minimum values are identified among all the country scores in the world, and the difference between these values is established as the range of "deprivation" on the measure: from 0 (*total deprivation*) to 1 (*none*). The three deprivation scores are then simply averaged. Per capita GDP measure is not only logarithmically transformed but capped at the poverty line, so a country's mean income above the poverty line does not contribute anything to its score on the HDI. This further neutralizes pure wealth differences and emphasizes broad improvements in human welfare.

14. In doing so, I have not exactly followed the United Nation's four groupings of countries but rather looked for natural breaking points, leaving groupings of unequal number but more substantive meaning. In any case, since the selection of cutoff points was done independently of the location of countries on the cross-tabulated variable (regime type), this method of decomposing the sample should be no more biased than any other.

15. The appendix contains a complete listing of the countries in the cells of Table 2.

16. Significantly also, the five high-income countries in the world that are not democratic—semicompetitive Singapore and the state hegemonic regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—all rank significantly lower on HDI than on per capita GNP (out of 160 countries, 11 places lower for Singapore and from 26 to 43 places lower for the Persian Gulf oil states).

17. This is precisely why multiple regression analyses of the effects of socioeconomic development may be most informative when they employ independent variables that are lagged at least 5 to 10 years behind the time of the dependent variable, democracy.

18. This review has benefited from the insights of a similar recent review by Rueschemeyer (1991).

19. Although the index later came to be termed and accepted as one of "political representation," it actually is a better measure of the presence of multiparty competition. It awarded 2 points for each year in which there was a parliament with representatives from two or more parties, with the minority holding at least 30% of the seats (1 point if there were multiple parties in parliament but less than 30% for the minority); and 1 point for each year the country was

ruled by a chief executive who was the product of a competitive election. The study covered 21 years at the time, so a country could obtain up to 63 points, putting a heavy emphasis on the time dimension (Cutright, 1963, p. 256).

20. Olsen's (1968) combined index of what he called political development consisted of 5 measures that tapped substantially (though not exclusively) important dimensions of democracy: executive functioning (including interest aggregation), legislative functioning (including legislative effectiveness, interest aggregation, and civilian control of politics), number, stability, and interest aggregation of political parties, power diversification (constitutionality of government, number of autonomous branches, and breadth of political recruitment), and citizen influence (freedom of the press and of group opposition).

21. This seemed to give particular support to Lerner's (1958) emphasis on the causal primacy of expanding communication, but Lerner's dependent variable was not democracy but political participation more generally.

22. However, what Winham (1970) is explaining here is not really "democratization" or "democraticness" in the same sense as the cross-sectional studies are testing. Because the score on Cutright's (1963) measure was relatively constant from 1830 to 1960 in the United States (see Winham's Table 3), it is mainly expansion in electoral participation that Winham was measuring and explaining over time.

23. The cross-lagged correlation method can be an unreliable method for drawing causal inferences. It attempts to infer causation by determining whether or not the correlation between, say, economic development at Time 1 and democracy at Time 2 is stronger than that between democracy at Time 1 and economic development at Time 2. However, even if the latter correlation exceeds the former, structural equations methods suggest that the former causal path (development → democracy) may still be the stronger one if democracy is much less stable over time than development (Diamond, 1980, pp. 93-94).

24. Bollen (1980, p. 384) subsequently demonstrated this again, showing that while Jackman's democracy measure and Bollen's own (rather similar) one paralleled the Cutright measure in showing a strong relationship to the level of development, Cutright's measure also was significantly related to the timing of national development while neither the Bollen nor the Jackman measure showed any significant relationship.

25. Coulter (1975) should have seen his data as suspect when the Soviet Union obtained the highest score of 85 countries on his measure of "participation" (Table 1.1)! Needless to say, his measure did not require that voting be in *democratic* elections. Not surprising, this dimension of his liberal democracy index correlates weakly with the other two (.20 with competitiveness and .19 with public liberties) and with measures of socioeconomic development or "mobilization." Also not surprising, Coulter finds weaker correlation coefficients between socioeconomic development indicators and liberal democracy and weaker regression coefficients for the effects of the former (Table 2.1) than do a number of other studies. While his general finding—that economic development (per capita GNP) is the modernization variable most strongly associated with democracy—accords with other evidence, his scale is too compromised to invest much confidence in this finding. Of his three dimensions of democracy, the one which is substantively valid, public liberties, is—not coincidentally—also the one best predicted by economic development level in his multiple regression analyses. Perhaps even more interesting, in examining *rates* of change in development levels (which few studies have done), Coulter found that "economic-development rate is the most important factor in the regression equation when explaining public liberties; the other four rates have little influence" (p. 28).

26. Bollen's measure of political democracy, used in a number of others' studies, is an index of six components. Three are indicators of political liberties—press freedom, freedom of group opposition, and government sanctions (censorships, curfews, political arrests and bans, and so

on)—and the other three are measures of popular sovereignty—fairness of elections, executive selection, and legislative selection. Each of the six components was linearly transformed to a range from 0 to 100 and weighted equally.

27. This inference against modernization theory is questionable in general and in any case not reasonably applied to Lipset's thesis because he had argued that the various dimensions of socioeconomic development were so intercorrelated as to form one broad syndrome, and per capita GNP is obviously the strongest indicator for that syndrome. The fact that education and urbanization did not add independent causal weight, when controlling for per capita GNP, thus does not discredit or falsify the Lipset thesis. Moreover, of the 12 regressions that included one or the other economic dependence measure (export partner concentration or the log of per capita foreign investment), only 3 showed significant effects on political centralism (i.e., authoritarianism). All three of these were positive, but in three other regressions, the effect was weakly negative.

28. The time lags tested were 1965-1970-1975, 1970-1975-1980, 1975-1980-1985, 1960-1970-1980, and 1965-1975-1985. The measure of economic dependence tested was international trade as a proportion of GNP, while military expenditures were treated as a proportion of the national budget. The 10 path models also tested other modernization variables (urbanization, secondary education, and radios per 1,000 population), but because few of these showed significant effects and, when entered together with other development variables, generated serious problems of multicollinearity, they were not included in the final regressions. As in most other research of this kind, per capita GNP was transformed logarithmically. In addition to Kyoung-Ryung Seong, Jingsheng Huang assisted in this analysis.

29. This is most persuasively indicated by Hannan and Carroll's (1981) event history analysis, showing that per capita GNP has a very strong and significant effect in inhibiting transitions away from multiparty regimes (pp. 28-29).

30. As noted earlier, the effect of economic development on authoritarianism was less often statistically significant in a sample of new nations. For Thomas et al. (1979), that effect, however, remained consistently negative and "substantively significant; the lack of statistical significance most likely is due to the dramatic loss of cases" (p. 197).

31. The correlations with economic development of the nation were .67 for life satisfaction and .53 for trust. Life satisfaction correlated .85 with the number of years that a nation had functioned continuously as a democracy.

32. During the 1967-1976 period, it was 4.5 per million population among that group, compared to 1.3 among the next development level and 0 at the two highest levels.

33. Had Powell (1982) been less strict in his criteria for the sample, including some African countries, like Nigeria, which experienced electoral competition more briefly and superficially, his observed association would probably have been even more striking. Interestingly, the association between riots and development level was much weaker; with median yearly riots per million people actually highest among the more rapidly modernizing countries, like Greece, Chile, and Uruguay (which all broke down during this period), as Huntington's (1968) theory and Huntington and Nelson (1976) would predict.

34. This rate exceeded the average during that period for any of the World Bank's four income groups and was well in excess of that (2.3%) for middle-income countries (World Bank, 1991, Table 1).

35. By civil society I mean the entire social arena of organized groups (whether based on functional interests, civic purposes, religion, or ethnicity) and of social movements, mass media, intellectual currents and centers, and artistic and symbolic modes of expression that are autonomous from the state but relate or speak to the state (see Chazan, 1991, pp. 4-9; Diamond, 1992a, p. 7; Stepan, 1988, pp. 3-4). As Chazan (1991) has suggested, civil society also implies

notions of pluralism and partiality: that no group seeks to represent the totality of an individual's interests, and thus that there must be multiple conveyors of interest and meaning in society.

36. The 10 countries are India, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana, Mauritius, and Papua New Guinea.

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